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I. INTRODUCTION
AS indicated by the ever increasing number of employment law
cases annually reviewed in this Article, the relationship between
Pemployers and their employees continues to be the subject of
significant discord. Employees who believe themselves the target of dis-
criminatory, unlawful, or simply unfair treatment will often seek recourse
through our judicial system. The employment litigation avenues are
many. Current and former employees regularly assert a panoply of
claims, both federal and state, statutory and tort. As the parameters of
these causes of action are routinely challenged, and each case presents
unique and oftentimes compelling facts, Texas courts are faced with ma-
neuvering through an intricate network of legislative enactments and
common law issues. Annually, the Supreme Court of Texas examines a
number of these issues, providing in recent years, greater clarification
without abandonment of the employment-at-will doctrine, while limiting
adoption of expanded tort theories such as a duty of good faith and fair
dealing or negligent infliction of emotional distress.
II. EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE
The employment-at-will doctrine provides that employment for an in-
definite term may be terminated at-will and without cause, absent an
agreement to the contrary.' Although the Texas Legislature has enacted
statutory exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine, 2 the doctrine has
1. E.g., Federal Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Tex. 1993), rev'g
per curiam, 838 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992); Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc.,
813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex. 1991); Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 795 S.W.2d
723,723 (Tex. 1990) (citing East Line & R.R.R. Co. v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70, 75, 10 S.W. 99, 102
(1888)); Hussong v. Schwan's Sales Enter., Inc., 896 S.W.2d 320, 324 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1995, no writ); Cotd v. Rivera, 894 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, no
writ); Loftis v. Town of Highland Park, 893 S.W.2d 154, 155 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1995, no
writ); Sebesta v. Kent Elec. Corp., 886 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1994, writ denied); Mott v. Montgomery County, 882 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. App.-Beau-
mont 1994, writ denied); Farrington v. Sysco Food Serv., Inc., 865 S.W.2d 247, 252 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied); Doe v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 855
S.W.2d 248, 254 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993), modified and remanded on other grounds, 903
S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1995); Amador v. Tan, 855 S.W.2d 131, 133 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993,
writ denied).
2. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4512.7, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (discharge for
refusing to participate in an abortion); TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 125.001 (Vernon Supp.
1994) (discharge for exercising rights under Agricultural Hazard Communication Act);
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 122.001 (Vernon 1986) (discharge for jury service);
TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 161.007 (Vernon 1986) (discharge for attending political conven-
tion); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 158.209 (West 1996) (discharge due to withholding order
for child support); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 431.005, 431.006 (Vernon 1990) (discharge
for military service); id. § 554.002 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (discharge of public employee for
reporting violation of law to appropriate enforcement authority); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 242.133 (Vernon 1992) (discharge of nursing home employee for reporting
abuse or neglect of a resident); id. § 502.013 (Vernon 1992) (discharge for exercising rights
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remained intact, with only one narrow public policy exception, for the last
105 years.3 In 1985, the Texas Supreme Court created the only non-statu-
under Hazard Communication Act); id. § 592.015 (Vernon 1992) (discharge due to the
mental retardation); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.051 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (discharge based
on race, color, handicap, religion, national origin, age, or sex); id. § 21.055 (Vernon Supp.
1994) (discharge for opposing, reporting or testifying about violations of the Commission
on Human Rights Act); id. § 52.041 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (discharge for refusing to make
purchase from employer's store); id. § 52.051 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (discharge for comply-
ing with a subpoena); id. § 101.052 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (discharge for membership or
nonmembership in a union); id. § 451.001 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (discharge based on good
faith workers' compensation claim).
There are also numerous federal statutory exceptions to an employer's right to discharge
an employee-at-will. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-168 (1973 & Supp. 1990) (discharge for union activity, protected concerted activity,
filing charges or giving testimony); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 215-216
(1994) (discharge for exercising rights guaranteed by the minimum wage and overtime pro-
visions of the Act); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1994) (discharge based on discrimination); Civil Rights Act of 1991, 29 U.S.C. § 626; 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1981a, 1988, 2000e, 2000e-1, 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-16 (1994) (discharged
based on discrimination); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-
678 (1994) (discharge of employees for exercising rights under the Act); Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1994) (discharge on basis of disability in programs receiving
federal funds); Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1140-
1141 (1994) (discharge of employees to prevent them from attaining vested pension rights);
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994) (discharge to inter-
fere with or deny employee's exercise of rights under FMLA); Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1211-1217 (1994) (discharge on basis of disability); Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 1870, and 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1985-1992, 1994-1996 (1994) (dis-
charge for discriminatory reasons); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2000e-16 (1981 & Supp. 1990) (discharge on the basis of race, sex, pregnancy,
national origin and religion).
3. Schroeder, 813 S.W.2d at 489; McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 807 S.W.2d 577
(Tex. 1991); Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 726; Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733,
735 (Tex. 1985); East Line, 72 Tex. 70, 75, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888); Amador, 855 S.W.2d at
133 (refusing to create additional public policy exceptions to the at-will rule); Jones v.
Legal Copy, Inc., 846 S.W.2d 922, 925 Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) ("The
employment-at-will doctrine is the law of our state."); Federal Express Corp. v.
Dutschmann, 838 S.W.2d 804, 808 Tex. App.-Waco 1992), rev'd per curiam on other
grounds, 846 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. 1993); Bernard v. Browning-Ferris Indus., No. 01-92-00134-
CV, 1994 WL 575520, *9 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.], Oct. 20, 1994, writ denied)
("Texas continues to remain committed to the judicially created employment-at-will doc-
trine"); Farrington, 865 S.W.2d at 252 (Texas adheres to the employment-at-will doctrine);
Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Hatridge, 831 S.W.2d 65, 68 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ
denied); McAlister v. Medina Elec. Coop., Inc., 830 S.W.2d 659, 664 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1992, writ denied); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Coward, 829 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1992, writ denied); see also Halkias v. General Dynamics Corp., 31 F.3d
224, 235 (5th Cir. 1994) (Texas remains an employment-at-will state); Camp v. Ruffin, 30
F.3d 37, 38-39 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1314 (1995) (Texas employees are
terminable at-will; Moulton v. City of Beaumont, 981 F.2d 227, 230 (5th Cir. 1993); Pease v.
Pakhoed Corp., 980 F.2d 995, 1000 (5th Cir. 1993) (employment-at-will doctrine well set-
tled in Texas); Crum v. American Airlines, Inc., 946 F.2d 423, 426 (5th Cir. 1991) (at-will
doctrine alive and well in Texas); Guthrie v. Tifco Indus., 941 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1267 (1992) (recognizing only one exception to at-will doctrine in Texas);
Zimmerman v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co., 932 F.2d 469, 471 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
984 (1991) (Texas courts continue to follow historical at-will rule); Spiller v. Ella Smithers
Geriatric Ctr., 919 F.2d 339, 345 (5th Cir. 1990) (Texas Supreme Court "has decided that a
public policy halo surrounds the at-will doctrine"); Manning v. Upjohn Co., 862 F.2d 545,
547 (5th Cir. 1989) (Texas courts not hesitant to declare employment-at-will doctrine alive
and well); Rayburn v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 805 F. Supp. 1401, 1403
(S.D. Tex. 1992) (Texas courts have long recognized the employment-at-will doctrine); Pe-
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tory exception to the at-will doctrine in Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v.
Hauck.4 The Sabine Pilot court held that public policy, as expressed in
the laws of Texas and the United States which carry criminal penalties,
required an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine when an em-
ployee has been discharged for refusing to perform a criminally illegal act
ordered by his employer. 5 Since that decision, many discharged employ-
rez v. Vinnell Corp., 763 F. Supp. 199, 200 (S.D. Tex. 1991) (recognizing long-standing at-
will doctrine in Texas); Taylor v. Houston Lighting and Power Co., 756 F. Supp. 297, 301
(S.D. Tex. 1990) (Texas courts have continuously recognized employment-at-will rule. See
generally Garcia v. Reaves County, Tex., 32 F.3d 200, 203-04 (5th Cir. 1994) (pursuant to
TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 85.003(c) (Vernon 1987)) (deputies' employment is termi-
nable at-will and county commissioners have no authority to change that status).
4. 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985). In 1989, the Texas Supreme Court created a short-
lived second exception in McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989),
rev'd, 498 U.S. 133 (1990), affd on remand, 807 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1991). The court held
that public policy favoring the integrity in pension plans requires an exception to the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine when an employee proves that the principal reason for his dis-
charge was the employer's desire to avoid contributing to or paying for benefits under the
employee's pension fund. Id. at 71. The United States Supreme Court, however, held that
ERISA preempted the McClendon common law cause of action. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.
McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 (1990). In 1990, the Texas Supreme Court declined an op-
portunity to expand the public policy exception in Sabine Pilot or to adopt a private whistle
blower exception to the at-will doctrine. Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 723. For a complete dis-
cussion of Winters, see Philip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall, Employment and Labor Law,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 331, 334-36 (1991) [hereinafter Pfeiffer & Hall,
1991 Annual Survey]. See also Thompson v. El Centro Del Barrio, 905 S.W.2d 356, 356
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, writ denied) (issue of private whistle blower cause of ac-
tion should be left to the legislature and the supreme court); Burgess v. El Paso Cancer
Treatment Ctr., 881 S.W.2d 552, 555-56 (Tex. App.-El Paso, writ denied) (following Win-
ters). The Texas Whistle Blower Act, TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 554.002 (Vernon 1994)
protects state employees from adverse employment decisions for reporting in good faith
violation of law to an appropriate law enforcement authority.
Assuming that the Texas Supreme Court eventually recognizes a second exception to the
at-will doctrine to protect private employees from adverse employment decisions for re-
porting in good faith a violation of law to an appropriate law enforcement authority, see
Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 725, such a cause of action will probably generate a significant
amount of litigation. See Texas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Green, 855 S.W.2d 136 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1993, writ denied) (jury awarded $13,500,000 to a state employee discharged
for reporting wrongdoings within his agency); see also Beiser v. Tomball Hosp. Auth., 902
S.W.2d 721, 725 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied); Jones v. City of
Stephenville, 896 S.W.2d 574, 577 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1995, no writ); City of Houston v.
Leach, 819 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (employee
recovered damages after being discharged from employment for reporting violations of law
to the appropriate authorities); Lastor v. City of Hearne, 810 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tex. App.-
Waco 1991, writ denied) (city employee discharged for reporting violation of law recovered
damages under Texas Whistle Blower Act). But see Robertson v. Bell Helicopter Textron,
Inc., 32 F.3d 948, 952 (5th Cir. 1994) (employee failed to present sufficient evidence to
support a finding that his employer was aware that Robertson's actions exceeded the scope
of his duties as contract administrator); City of Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143, 144
(Tex. 1995); Blocker v. Terrell Hills City, 900 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995,
writ denied) (police officer's termination was for altercation with another police officer and
not for reporting that the city manager kept separate overtime records in violation of the
Fair Labor Standards Act).
5. Sabine Pilot, 687 S.W.2d at 735; see Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1171 n.16
(5th Cir. 1988) ("Sabine Pilot can be reasonably read as restricted to instances where the
violations of law the employee refused to commit 'carry criminal penalties."'); Higginbot-
ham v. Allwaste, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied)
(employer cannot confront an employee with the choice of performing an illegal act or risk
1104 [Vol. 50
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ees have unsuccessfully tried to bring their claim of wrongful discharge
within that exception. 6
In Ebasco Constructors, Inc. v. Rex, 7 John Rex sued his former em-
ployer Ebasco Constructors (Ebasco) claiming that he was discharged for
refusing to participate in a criminal conspiracy. Rex worked for Ebasco
on the South Texas Nuclear Project and asserted that he was asked to
claim work as completed when it was not, and to verify falsified docu-
ments, conduct which would have been a federal crime. Recognizing the
public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine exists where
an employee is discharged "for the sole reason that the employee refused
to perform an illegal act,"8 the court found sufficient evidence to support
the jury's determination that Rex's supervisor was involved in a criminal
conspiracy, and that Rex was terminated for refusing to perform illegal
termination for insubordination). But see Johnston v. Del Mar Distrib. Co., 776 S.W.2d
768 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied). In Del Mar, the court held that
the Sabine Pilot exception necessarily covers a situation where an employee
has a good faith belief that her employer has requested her to perform an act
which may subject her to criminal penalties. Public policy demands that she
be allowed to investigate into whether such actions are legal so that she can
determine what course of action to take (i.e., whether or not to perform the
act).
Id. at 771.
6. Eg., Pease v. Pakhoed Corp., 980 F.2d 995, 999-1000 (5th Cir. 1993) (amended
complaint that fails to allege that plaintiff was ordered to violate laws that carried criminal
penalties does not state claim under Sabine Pilot); Guthrie, 941 F.2d at 379 (allegation that
plaintiff was instructed to violate unspecified customs regulations does not state claim
under Sabine Pilot); Aitkens v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., No 90-2884, slip op. at 3 (5th Cir.
June 14, 1991) (not published) (dentist's contention that he was fired for refusing to violate
ethical or professional standards or to engage in tortious activities insufficient under Sabine
Pilot); Willy, 855 F.2d at 1171 n.16 (Sabine Pilot exception is limited to cases where the
violations of law which the employee refused to commit carry criminal penalties); Ray v.
Westlake Polymers Corp., No. H-93-3258 (S.D. Tex. May 16, 1994); Winters, 795 S.W.2d at
724-25 (Texas Supreme Court declined to extend Sabine Pilot to cover employees who
reported illegal activities); Mott, 882 S.W.2d at 639 (employment-at-will does not violate
public policy, statutes, or common law of the state); Ford v. Landmark Graphics Corp., 875
S.W.2d 33, 34-35 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, no writ) (Sabine Pilot does not apply to
employee who reports employer's alleged illegal activities); Farrington, 865 S.W.2d at 253
(employer's requirement that employee take a polygraph test not within Sabine Pilot ex-
ception); Medina v. Lanabi, Inc., 855 S.W.2d 161, 163-65 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1993, writ denied) (employees failed to bring claim within Sabine Pilot exception); Casas v.
Wornick Co., 818 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991), rev'd on other
grounds, 856 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. 1993) (discharged employee who claimed discharge was due
to her possession of information which could implicate the company in criminal miscon-
duct did not state claim under Sabine Pilot); Paul v. P.B.-K.B.B., Inc., 801 S.W.2d 229, 230
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (claim of discharge due to objections
to exploratory shaft for a nuclear waste storage project for Department of Energy not
within Sabine Pilot); Hancock v. Express One Int'l, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 634, 636-37 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied) (court declined to extend Sabine Pilot to include employ-
ees discharged for performing illegal acts which carry civil penalties); Burt v. City of Burk-
burnett, 800 S.W.2d 625, 626-27 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied) (claim of
discharged police officer that discharge was the result of his refusal not to arrest a promi-
nent citizen for public intoxication and thus refusing to perform an illegal act not within
Sabine Pilot).
7. 923 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied).




In Spradling v. Corbett,10 Roger Corbett filed suit against his former
employer, Spradling, alleging wrongful termination. The trial court disre-
garded the jury's finding in favor of Corbett on the wrongful termination
claim, and Corbett appealed. The appeals court upheld the trial court's
decision in disregarding the jury finding of wrongful termination.11 The
court explained that it was undisputed that Corbett was an at-will em-
ployee, and Corbett did not plead that there were any contractual limita-
tions on Spradling's right to terminate or that he was discharged solely
for performing an illegal act, the limited exceptions to the at-will doc-
trine.12 Instead, Corbett asserted wrongful termination in connection
with the manner of his termination in that he was sent out of town and
locked out of the business without any warning and was subsequently
fired. The court held that because these facts, even if proved, did not
place Corbett within the recognized exceptions to the at-will doctrine, the
trial court did not err in disregarding the finding of wrongful
termination. 13
In Willy v. Coastal States Management Co.,14 Donald Willy brought suit
against Coastal States Management Company (Coastal), for wrongful ter-
mination. Willy alleged he was fired from his position as an in-house at-
torney solely for his refusal to falsify environmental reports and
participate in the criminal concealment of state and federal environmen-
tal law violations. Willy asserted that he was covered by the Sabine Pilot
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. Coastal countered by as-
serting that a client may terminate its lawyer, including in-house counsel,
for any reason. Moreover, Coastal asserted that Willy's claim would fail
because even if a valid claim existed, Willy could only prove his claim by
violating his duty of confidentiality.15 On appeal following a jury verdict
for Willy, the court determined that "an attorneys's status as in-house
counsel does not preclude the attorney from maintaining a claim for
wrongful termination under Sabine Pilot if the claim can be proved with-
out any violation of the attorney's obligation to respect client confidences
and secrets.' 6 Following review of the Texas Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility and other authority, and finding no exception allowing Willy
to reveal confidences for the purpose of proving his claim of wrongful
termination against his client,17 the court reversed the trial court and ren-
dered judgment for Coastal.' 8
9. Id. at 700.
10. No. 07-95-0158-CV, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 3181 (Tex. App.-Amarillo, July 23,
1996, writ denied) (not released for publication).
11. Id. at *14.
12. Id. at *15.
13. Id.
14. 939 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ requested).
15. Id. at 198.
16. Id. at 200.
17. Id. at 200-01.
18. Id. at 201.
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In Stroud v. VBFSB Holding Corp.,19 the court was presented with a
case of first impression when employee Terry Stroud submitted a letter of
resignation, terminated his employment, and thereafter sued his former
employer, First Federal Savings Bank (FFSB) for constructive discharge.
Equating constructive discharge to wrongful termination under Sabine
Pilot, Stroud alleged he tendered his resignation because he was asked to
engage in illegal acts. The trial court granted summary judgment for
FFSB, and Stroud appealed. The appeals court affirmed summary judg-
ment for FFSB without determining whether a constructive discharge
cause of action exists under Sabine Pilot.20
Holding that a cause of action for constructive discharge accrues when
the party knows of his injury, rather than on the technical last date of
employment, the appeals court concluded that summary judgment was
appropriate as Stroud's claim was barred by limitations.21 Because any
acts contributing to the constructive discharge must have occurred before
June 13, 1991, the date on which Stroud tendered his resignation, Stroud
knew of his injury by that date and his cause of action therefore accrued
on June 13, 1991. When Stroud did not file suit within two years thereaf-
ter, his claim for wrongful discharge was barred by limitations.
A. COMMON LAW CLAIMS
When the term of employment is left to the discretion of either party or
is left indefinite, either party may terminate the contract at-will and with-
out cause.22 During the past several years, however, wrongful discharge
litigation based on the violation of a written or oral employment agree-
ment has increased. Written or oral employment agreements may indeed
modify the at-will rule and require the employer to have good cause for
the discharge of an employee. 23
In Wilson v. Sysco Food Services of Dallas, Inc.,24 Mia Wilson brought
suit alleging that Sysco Food Services of Dallas (Sysco) breached its em-
ployment contract with her by terminating Wilson without cause and by
failing to judge Wilson on the basis of merit. Recognizing "[e]mployment
relationships in Texas are terminable at-will unless modified by a specific
19. 917 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied).
20. Id. at 81.
21. Id. at 80-81.
22. E.g., Papaila v. Uniden Am. Corp., 840 F. Supp. 440, 445 (N.D. Tex. 1994);
Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d at 282; Schroeder, 813 S.W.2d at 489; East Line, 72 Tex. at 75, 10
S.W. at 102; Lee-Wright, Inc. v. Hall, 840 S.W.2d 572, 577 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1992, no writ); see also Philip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall, Employment and Labor Law,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 42 Sw. L.J. 97, 98-99 nn.8 & 9 (1988) (citing several cases
discussing employment-at-will doctrine).
23. Papaila, 840 F. Supp. at 445; East Line, 72 Tex. at 75, 10 S.W. at 102; Goodyear
Tire and Rubber Co. v. Portilla, 836 S.W.2d 664, 667-68; cf. Sabine Pilot, 687 S.W.2d at 735
(court held that an at-will employee may not be terminated for refusing to commit illegal
act, noting statutory limitations on employment-at-will doctrine). See generally Op. Tex.
Att'y Gen. No. JM-941 (1988) (employees of the state are generally at-will employees).
24. 940 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1996). For an additional discussion of Wilson, see
text accompanying infra notes 130-32, 235-40.
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agreement," 25 the court noted Wilson's failure to offer any evidence of
written or oral representations providing that Sysco had relinquished its
right to terminate at-will.26 In fact, the Sales Representative Employ-
ment Agreement provided that Sysco could "terminate Employee's em-
ployment hereunder at any time, for any reason, and without cause, upon
notice to Employee."'27 Sysco's employee handbook stated that Sysco ad-
hered to the principles of at-will employment and could terminate an em-
ployee at any time and for any reason. As a result, Wilson also could not
establish a claim for breach of contract.28
1. Written Modifications of the Employment-At-Will Doctrine
To avoid the employment-at-will doctrine and establish a cause of ac-
tion for wrongful termination based on a written contract, an employee
must prove that he and his employer had a contract that specifically pro-
hibited the employer from terminating the employee's service at-will.29
The written contract must provide in a "special and meaningful way" 30
that the employer does not have the right to terminate the employment
relationship at-will.31 The necessity of a written contract arises from the
statute of frauds requirement that an agreement which is not to be per-
25. Id. at 1013.
26. Id. at 1013-14.
27. Id. at 1013.
28. Id.; see Camp, 30 F.3d at 39 (because there was no written contract, employment
was terminable at-will and could not serve as basis of claim for breach of contract).
29. Moulton, 991 F.2d at 230; Zimmerman, 932 F.2d at 471 (applying Texas law); Com-
prehensive Care Corp. v. Bosch, 899 S.W.2d 435, 437-38 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, no
writ); Loftis, 893 S.W.2d at 155; Farrington, 865 S.W.2d at 253; Lee-Wright, 840 S.W.2d at
577; Day & Zimmerman, 831 S.W.2d at 68; Wilhite v. H.E. Butt Co., 812 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ); Salazar v. Amigos Del Valle, Inc., 754 S.W.2d 410,
413 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ); Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 750
S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied); Benoit v. Polysar
Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403,406 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Web-
ber v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
30. Massey v. Houston Baptist Univ., 902 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1995, writ denied); Hussong, 896 S.W.2d at 324-25; Lee Wright, 840 S.W.2d at 577
(quoting Benoit, 728 S.W.2d at 406); see also infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
31. Morton v. Southern Union Co., No. 3-89-0939-H, slip op. at 8 (N.D. Tex. June 17,
1991); Knerr v. Neiman Marcus, Inc., No. H-90-3641 (S.D. Tex. July 28,1992); Lee-Wright,
840 S.W.2d at 577; Rodriguez v. Benson Properties, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 275, 277 (W.D. Tex.
1989); Farrington, 865 S.W.2d at 253; McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 757 S.W.2d 816,
818 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 779 S.W.2d 69, 70
(Tex. 1989), rev'd, 498 U.S. 133 (1990), affd on remand, 807 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1991) (citing
Benoit, 728 S.W.2d at 406); Stiver, 750 S.W.2d at 846; Webber, 720 S.W.2d at 127. In Web-
ber, the court held that to establish a cause of action for wrongful discharge, the discharged
employee must prove that there was a written employment agreement that specifically
provided that the employer did not have the right to terminate the contract at-will. Id. at
126. In Benoit, 728 S.W.2d at 406, the court added that the writing must "in a meaningful
and special way" limit the employer's right to terminate the employment at-will. But cf
Winograd v. Willis, 789 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ de-
nied) (court suggested that the phrase "in a special and meaningful way" is not a necessary
part of analysis); Hockaday v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, 914 F. Supp. 1439 (S.D. Tex.
1996) (failure to establish contract restricting disciplinary actions available to employer
constitutes employment at-will).
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formed within one year from the date of the making must be in writing to
be enforceable. 32
Where no actual employment contract exists, arguments have been
made that an employer's letter to an employee regarding his position or
salary (stated per week, month or year) may provide a basis upon which
the employee may argue that there is a written employment contract.
The cases, however, are somewhat difficult to reconcile and appear to be
decided on the specific facts involved.33
A similar, but usually unsuccessful argument for avoiding the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine is the argument that an employee handbook or em-
ployment application constitutes a contractual modification of the at-will
relationship.34 Texas courts have generally rejected such arguments, in-
stead adhering to the general rule that employee handbooks do not con-
stitute written employment agreements, provided the handbooks (1) give
the employer the right to unilaterally amend or withdraw the handbook,
32. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b)(6) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1987); Rodri-
guez, 716 F. Supp. at 277; Bowser v. McDonald's Corp., 714 F. Supp. 839, 842 (S.D. Tex.
1989); Winograd, 789 S.W.2d at 310-11 (citing Niday v. Niday, 643 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex.
1982); Morgan v. Jack Brown Cleaners, Inc. 764 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989,
writ denied)); Stiver, 750 S.W.2d at 846; Benoit, 728 S.W.2d at 406.
33. Massey, 902 S.W.2d at 83-84 (salary quoted per month created one month contract
at most); Hussong, 896 S.W.2d at 324 (citing general rule); Lee-Wright, 840 S.W.2d at 577
(citing general rule); see Winograd, 789 S.W.2d at 310 (letter confirming employment and
annual salary held to be a contract of employment); Dobson v. Metro Label Corp., 786
S.W.2d 63, 65-66 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ) (memorandum reflecting annual salary
held insufficient to constitute a contract); W. Pat Crow Forgings, Inc. v. Casarez, 749
S.W.2d 192, 194 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ denied) (letter agreement promoting
employee to supervisor and assuring employee that he could return to previous position if
he was not a satisfactory supervisor protected employee from at-will termination); Dech v.
Daniel, Mann, Johnson & Mendenhall, 748 S.W.2d 501, 503 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1988, no writ) (employer's subsequent confirmation letter regarding employment
and employee's annual salary held not to be a written contract); Sorenson v. Ingram Petro-
leum Servs., Inc., 851 F.2d 1420 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (offer of employment "at a rate of $58,000
per year" merely established rate of pay; contract was otherwise for unlimited duration
and, therefore, terminable at-will.); see also Molnar v. Engels, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 224, 225
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (demand for annual salary indicates plain-
tiff assumed his employment agreement was for 1-year term); Watts v. St. Mary's Hall, Inc.,
662 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (letter stating the salary
and length of employment equated to a contract for term of employment); Culkin v. Nei-
man-Marcus Co., 354 S.W.2d, 400-01 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1962, writ ref'd) (letter
presented jury question as to terms of employment); Dallas Hotel Co. v. Lackey, 203
S.W.2d 557, 562 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (letter contemplating at
least one year of employment together with plaintiff's detrimental reliance on contents of
letter presented jury question); Dallas Hotel Co. v. McCue, 25 S.W.2d 902, 905-06 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1930, no writ) (without specified period of service, the determination is
fact sensitive).
34. Falconer v. Soltex Polymer Corp., No. 89-2216, slip op. at 8-9 (5th Cir. Sept. 12,
1989) (not published); Bowser, 714 F. Supp. at 842; Glagola v. North Texas Mun. Water
Dist., 705 F. Supp. 1220, 1224 (E.D. Tex. 1989); Valdez v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 683
F. Supp. 596, 622 (W.D. Tex. 1988); Abston v. Levi Strauss & Co., 684 F. Supp. 152, 156
(E.D. Tex. 1987); Cord, 894 S.W.2d at 540; Day & Zimmerman, 831 S.W.2d at 69;
Salazar, 754 S.W.2d at 413; Stiver, 750 S.W.2d at 846; see also Brian K. Lowry, The Vestiges
of the Texas Employment-At-Will Doctrine in the Wake of Progressive Law: The Employ-
ment Handbook Exception, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 327 (1986) (applying principles of consider-
ation and mutuality to employment handbooks).
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(2) contain an express disclaimer that the handbook constitutes an em-
ployment contract, or (3) do not include an express agreement mandating
specific procedures for discharging employees. 35 Therefore, employee
claims of a contractual modification of the at-will relationship based on a
handbook have generally been unsuccessful. 36
Employment contracts may also modify the at-will rule. Texas follows
the general rule which provides that hiring at a stated sum per week,
month, or year is definite employment for the period named and may not
be ended at-will.37 Once the employee meets his burden of establishing
that the contract of employment is for a term, the employer has the bur-
den to establish good cause for the discharge. 38 To establish a claim for
wrongful discharge, the employee has the burden to prove that he and his
employer had a contract that specifically provided that the employer did
not have the right to terminate the employment at-will and that the em-
ployment contract was in writing if the contract exceeded one year in
duration.39 Again, the writing must limit the employer's right to termi-
nate the employment at-will "in a meaningful and special way."'40 For
35. Spuler v. Pickar, 958 F.2d 103, 107 (5th Cir. 1992); Crum, 946 F.2d at 427; Zimmer-
man, 932 F.2d at 471-72; Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co., 932 F.2d 458, 462-63 (5th Cir. 1991);
Manning, 862 F.2d at 547 n.2; Joachim v. ATJT Info. Sys., 793 F. 2d 113, 114 (5th Cir.
1986); Perez, 763 F. Supp. at 200-01; Bowser, 714 F. Supp. at 842; Valdez, 683 F. Supp. at
622; Abston, 684 F. Supp. at 156; Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d at 282; Washington v. Naylor
Indus. Servs., Inc., 893 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ);
Loftis, 893 S.W.2d at 155; Mott, 882 S.W.2d at 637; Johnson v. Randall's Food Mkts., Inc.,
869 S.W.2d 390, 400 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 891
S.W.2d 640 (Tex. 1995); Almazan v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 840 S.W.2d 776 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied); Day & Zimmerman, 831 S.W.2d at 69; McAlister,
830 S.W.2d at 664; Horton v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 827 S.W.2d 361, 370 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 1992, writ denied); Hicks v. Baylor Univ. Medical Ctr., 789 S.W.2d 299, 301-
02 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied); Lumpkin v. H & C Communications, Inc., 755
S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied); Salazar, 754 S.W.2d at
413; Stiver, 750 S.W.2d at 846; Benoit, 728 S.W.2d at 407; Webber, 720 S.W.2d at 128;
Berry v. Doctor's Health Facilities, 715 S.W.2d 60, 61 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ);
Totman v. Control Data Corp., 707 S.W.2d 739, 744 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ);
Vallone v. Agip Petroleum Co., 705 S.W.2d 757,758 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Reynolds Mfg. Co. v. Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1982, no writ). But see Texas Health Enters., Inc. v. Gentry, 787 S.W.2d 604, 608
(Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, no writ) (oral representation and portion of employee hand-
book supported breach of contract finding). Contra Aiello v. United Air Lines, Inc., 818
F.2d 1196, 1199-1200 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that a contract modifies at-will rule where
employee handbook included detailed procedures for discipline and discharge and ex-
pressly recognized an obligation to discharge only for good cause).
36. Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d at 284; Figueroa v. West, 902 S.W.2d 701, 705 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1995, no writ) (employment manual will modify employment at-will rela-
tionship only if manual specifically and expressly curtails the employer's right to terminate
the employee); Cote, 894 S.W.2d at 540-41 (employee handbook merely establishing cer-
tain procedures for termination is not kind of express agreement that can modify an at-will
employment relationship); Washington, 893 S.W.2d at 312; Loftis, 893 S.W.2d at 156; Al-
mazan, 840 S.W.2d at 781; Day & Zimmerman, 831 S.W.2d at 69; McClendon, 757 S.W.2d
at 818.
37. Lee Wright, 840 S.W.2d at 577 (citing Lackey, 203 S.W.2d at 561).
38. Id. at 573 (citing Watts, 662 S.W.2d at 58).
39. Id. (citing Lumpkin, 755 S.W.2d at 539); Webber, 720 S.W.2d at 126; see Papaila,
840 F. Supp. at 445.
40. Lee Wright, 840 S.W.2d at 577 (quoting Benoit, 728 S.W.2d at 406).
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example, employment based upon an annual salary limits "in a meaning-
ful and special way" an employer's prerogative to terminate an employee
during the period stated.41
In Rios v. Texas Commerce Bancshares, Inc.,42 David Rios, a terni-
nated employee of Texas Commerce Bancshares (TCB), sued TCB for
breach of contract in connection with his termination. The trial court
granted TCB's motion for summary judgment on Rios's breach of con-
tract claim, and the court of appeals affirmed. In so doing, the court ex-
plained that to rebut the presumption of employment-at-will, an
employment contract must limit in a meaningful and special way the em-
ployer's right to terminate the employee without cause.43 The court then
noted that a hiring based on an agreement of an annual salary limits in a
meaningful and special way the employer's prerogative to discharge the
employee during the dictated period of employment."4 In this case, Rios
alleged that a letter dated March 19, 1985, promising Rios a base salary of
$28,000 with an annual review, constituted a contract of employment.
The court disagreed, explaining that although the letter was dated March
19, 1985, it did not specify a beginning date and did not specify a duration
of time upon which the salary was based.45 Further, Rios was not asked
to sign and return the letter to show that he accepted its terms. 46 The
court thus concluded that the letter did not create an employment agree-
ment or limit in any way the right of TCB to terminate Rios at-will.4 7
In Cortinas v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Texas,48 George Cor-
tinas sued for wrongful termination following discharge from Kaiser
Foundation Health Plan of Texas (Kaiser). Prior to Cortinas' termina-
tion, Kaiser management became unhappy with Cortinas' performance as
manager of the purchasing department and offered him the choice of de-
motion or leaving Kaiser. After Cortinas' demotion, Kaiser learned of
various unauthorized activities and violations of Kaiser policy occurring
in connection with operation of the purchasing department while under
41. Id. (citing Winograd, 789 S.W.2d at 310) (employer's agreement to hire employee
for 5 years at a salary of $2000 per month limits the employer's prerogative to terminate
the employee's employment except for good cause). But see Potrykus v. Abbey Healthcare
Group, Inc., No. 05-95-00823-CV, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 3359, at *7-8 (Tex. App.-Dallas,
July 23, 1996, writ denied) (not released for publication) (employee did not state cause of
action for breach of employment contract for failure to terminate for cause where employ-
ment contract also provided for specified amount of severance pay if employee was termi-
nated without cause, despite specific term for contract duration employee could terminate
with or without cause).
42. 930 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied). For additional dis-
cussion of Rios, see text accompanying infra notes 157-59, 304-07, and 452-58.




47. Id. In Rios the court also addressed and rejected Rios' claim that policy state-
ments and performance evaluations constituted written contracts of employment between
employer and employee. Id. at 816.
48. No. 05-95-00236-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas March 20, 1996, writ denied) (not desig-
nated for publication), 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 1111. For additional discussions of Cortinas,
see text accompanying infra notes 103-06, 192-97.
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Cortinas' direction. Kaiser detailed these circumstances in a letter to
Cortinas and terminated his employment. Asserting wrongful discharge,
Cortinas relied on the employee handbook to support his contention that
Kaiser's right to terminate at-will was limited. In response, the court
stated that a handbook does not affect the at-will relationship unless it
specifically and expressly limits the relationship and curtails the em-
ployer's rights to terminate the employee.4 9 Cortinas pointed to sections
of the handbook which stated Kaiser's policy that terminations and disci-
plinary actions should be carefully considered and handled in an orderly,
consistent and fair manner, listed ten violations that were just cause for
immediate dismissal, and listed other behavior that might result in pro-
gressive discipline leading to involuntary termination for just cause.50
The court rejected Cortinas' assertions, stating that it was clear from the
handbook that these were merely examples and not the exclusive reasons
for termination.51 Because the handbook did not specifically and ex-
pressly limit Kaiser's right to terminate Cortinas's employment it did not
affect the at-will relationship.5 2 As the handbook provided no more than
general guidelines, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in
favor of Kaiser and held that the handbook did not create contractual
rights as a matter of law. 53
In Brown v. Montgomery County Hospital District,54 Valerie Brown
sued her former employer, Montgomery County Hospital District (Mont-
gomery), alleging she was wrongfully terminated from her employment
for speaking out about another employee's alleged incompetence. Brown
alleged that her employee benefits manual constituted a written contract
of employment precluding her termination. The court rejected Brown's
claim, finding that the language of the employee manual revealed that
Brown's employment was at-will.55 In reaching this conclusion, the court
noted that the manual contained no language that implied an employee
could only be fired for good cause. The court observed that an employee
manual does not create a contract unless it explicitly limits the relation-
ship and restricts the employers right to terminate the employee.5 6 The
court held that the employee benefits manual did not modify the at-will
relationship as a matter of law. 57
In Schultz v. Academy Corp. ,58 Kevin Schultz sued Academy Corpora-
tion (Academy) for wrongful termination of employment in violation of a
49. Id. at *9.
50. Id. at *10.
51. Id. at *11.
52. Id.
53. Id. at *12.
54. 929 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1996, writ granted). For additional discus-
sions of Montgomery County Hosp., see text accompanying infra notes 90-93, 107-08.
55. Id. at 583.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. No. 04-95-00115-CV (Tex. App.-San Antonio, June 12, 1996, no writ) (not desig-
nated for publication), 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 2321. For an additional discussion of
Schultz, see text accompanying infra notes 94-98.
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written policy manual. Schultz contended that he was terminated by
Academy without cause and that Academy specifically modified his at-
will employment by publishing a termination policy that was not followed
in his case. The trial court granted Academy's motion for summary judg-
ment, and Schultz appealed. The court of appeals explained that a writ-
ten policy manual does not affect the at-will relationship unless it
specifically and expressly limits the relationship and curtails the em-
ployer's right to terminate an employee.59 Affirming summary judgment,
the court reasoned that by the language in Academy's manual, Academy
retained the right to discharge any employee without notice for any
reason.
60
The general principle that an employee handbook does not create a
contract between employer and employee has also been applied to an
employer's unilateral modification of benefits outlined in an employee
handbook.61 In Gamble, the employer, Gregg County, maintained a per-
sonnel manual which provided that employees would be paid, on termi-
nation of their employment, the value of one-half day's wages for each
day of accrued but unused sick leave. During Steve Gamble's employ-
ment, the county adopted a new personnel manual that restricted the
right to receive compensation in lieu of sick leave to retirees only. After
his resignation, Gamble sued Gregg County to recover compensation for
the sick leave to which he would have been entitled under the terms of
the original personnel manual.
The court of appeals explained that in an employment-at-will situation,
an employee policy handbook or manual does not, by itself, constitute a
binding contract or property interest for the benefits and policies stated
unless the manual uses language clearly indicating an intent to do so. 62
Because Gregg County's manual did not contain express contractual lan-
guage, but referred to its provisions only as "policies, practices, and
guidelines," and because the manual explicitly provided that the county
could unilaterally change the policies and practices, the court concluded
that the manual did not clearly express an intent to vest contractual or
property rights.63 The court explained that in an employment-at-will re-
lationship, either party may modify the employment terms as a condition
of continued employment, and such modifications are accepted as a mat-
ter of law if the employee continues working.64 The court concluded that
59. Id at *2-3.
60. Id. at *3.
61. Gamble v. Gregg County, 932 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, no writ);
see also Peoples v. Dallas Baptist Univ., No. 05-95-00583-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, no
writ) (not designated for publication), 1996 WL 253340. In Peoples, an at-will employee
sued University alleging termination was breach of contract, and the court held at-will
status precludes cause of action for wrongful discharge. Id. at *2. The court further held
that employee's claim that employer did not follow its procedures involving vacation and
sick pay was nothing more than wrongful discharge claim restated, again precluded by
employee's at-will status. Id. at *3.
62. Gamble, 932 S.W.2d at 255.
63. Id.
64. Id at 256.
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because Gamble continued working for the county after the personnel
manual had been changed to eliminate the right to payment for unused
sick leave, Gamble "gave up any right to claim benefits under the super-
seded manual. '65
2. Oral Modifications of the Employment-At-Will Doctrine
Usually, an employment relationship is created when employee and
employer orally agree to the terms and conditions of employment. Oral
employment contracts, however, may defeat an employer's right to termi-
nate an at-will employee depending upon the terms of the agreement and
the facts and circumstances surrounding the employment.
An employee may avoid the at-will rule when an employer enters into
an oral agreement that the employee will be terminated only for good
cause. 66 An employee may also allege that the employer's oral assurance
of employment for a specified period of time (greater than one year) cre-
ates an enforceable contract of employment. Normally, the employer will
counter this argument by alleging that the agreement violates the statute
of frauds. The statute of frauds provides that an oral agreement not to be
performed within one year from the date of its making is unenforceable. 67
The duration of the oral agreement determines whether the statute of
frauds renders the agreement invalid.68 When no period of performance
is stated in an oral employment contract, the general rule in Texas is that
the statute of frauds does not apply because the contract can be per-
formed within a year.69 If an oral agreement can cease upon some con-
tingency, other than by some fortuitous event or the death of one of the
parties,70 the agreement may be performed within one year, and the stat-
65. Id.
66. Mansell v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 135 Tex. 31, 137 S.W.2d 997, 999-1000 (1940);
Goodyear Tire, 836 S.W.2d at 667-68; see Morgan, 764 S.W.2d at 826; Ramos v. Henry C.
Beck Co., 711 S.W.2d 331, 336 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ); Johnson v. Ford Motor
Co., 690 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); St. Louis, B. & M. Ry.
Co. v. Booker, 5 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1928, writ ref d), cert. denied,
279 U.S. 852 (1929).
67. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. art. 26.01(a)(6) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1987); see
Morgan, 764 S.W.2d at 827; see also Rayburn, 805 F. Supp. at 1406. Of note, oral modifica-
tions to written employment agreements are also disfavored under Texas law. Conway v.
Saudi Arabian Oil Co., 867 F. Supp. 539, 542 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
68. Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 463 (citing Morgan, 764 S.W.2d at 827).
69. Id. at 463; Mercer v. C.A. Roberts Co., 570 F.2d 1232, 1236 (5th Cir. 1978) (inter-
preting Texas law); Morgan, 764 S.W.2d at 827; Miller v. Riata Cadillac Co., 517 S.W.2d
773, 775 (Tex. 1974); Bratcher v. Dozier, 162 Tex. 319, 320-22, 346 S.W.2d 795, 796-97
(1961); Wright v. Donaubauer, 137 Tex. 477, 154 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Tex. 1941); Kelley v.
Apache Prods., Inc., 709 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ ref d n.r.e.);
Robertson v. Pohorelsky, 583 S.W.2d 956, 958 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
70. Hurt v. Standard Oil Co., 444 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969, no
writ) (If, by terms of oral employment agreement, its period is to extend beyond a year
from date of its making, "the mere possibility of its termination ... within a year, because
of death or other fortuitous event, does not render [the statute of frauds] inapplicable."
(quoting Chevalier v. Lane's, Inc., 147 Tex. 106, 111, 213 S.W.2d 530, 532 (1948))).
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ute of frauds does not apply.71 Generally, the statute of frauds nullifies
only contracts that must last longer than one year.72
The success of the employee's claim depends largely on the nature of
the employer's assurance.73 For example, an oral agreement for employ-
ment until normal retirement age is unenforceable because the agree-
ment must last longer than one year, unless the promisee is within one
year of normal retirement age at the time the promise is made.74 The
courts are split on the applicability of the statute of frauds to an oral
promise of lifetime employment. Generally, more recent cases hold that
the promise of lifetime employment must be in writing,75 while older
cases conclude that such a promise does not need to be in writing because
the employee could conceivably die within one year of the oral promise. 76
The courts are also split on the applicability of the statute of frauds to an
oral promise of continued employment for as long as the promisee per-
forms his work satisfactorily. 77 Some cases hold that such a promise must
be in writing,78 while other cases conclude that a writing is not required
because the termination of employment could occur within a year of the
oral promise. 79 The law in this area is unclear in Texas and in the Fifth
71. Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 463-64 (citing McRae v. Lindale Indep. School Dist., 450 S.W.2d
118, 123-24 (Tex. Civ. App.-ler 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.)); Fruth v. Gaston, 187 S.W.2d
581, 584 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1945, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
72. Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 464; Niday, 643 S.W.2d at 920; Morgan, 764 S.W.2d at 827.
73. Morgan, 764 S.W.2d at 827 (citing Niday, 643 S.W.2d at 920).
74. Crenshaw v. General Dynamics Corp., 940 F.2d 125, 128 (5th Cir. 1991); Papaila,
840 F. Supp. at 445; Schroeder, 813 S.W.2d at 489; Stiver, 750 S.W.2d at 846; Benoit, 728
S.W.2d at 407; Molder v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 665 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hurt, 444 S.W.2d at 344.
75. Zimmerman, 932 F.2d at 472-73; Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 464; Rayburn, 805 F. Supp. at
1406; Massey, 902 S.W.2d at 84 (promise of permanent or lifetime employment must be
reduced to writing to be enforceable); Brown v. Employers Ins. Co. of Wausau, No. 01-94-
00554-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 19, 1995, no writ) (not designated for publi-
cation), 1995 WL 19225, at *5; Wal-Mart Stores, 829 S.W.2d at 342-43; Benoit, 728 S.W.2d
at 407; Webber v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W. 2d 124, 128 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
76. Chevalier, 147 Tex. at 110-11, 213 S.W.2d at 532; Central Nat'l Bank v. Cox, 96
S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1936, no writ); see also Gilliam v. Kouchoucos,
340 S.W.2d 27, 27-28 (Tex. 1960) (oral contract of employment for 10 years not excluded
from statute of frauds by provision that it would terminate upon death of employee). See
Young v. Ward, infra notes 80-89 and accompanying text for a recent case holding an oral
contract for lifetime employment enforceable.
77. Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 464-65 (applying Texas law and recognizing split of authority);
Rayburn, 805 F. Supp. at 1406 (noting conflict between Pruitt and Falconer).
78. Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 465 (holding that it was bound to follow Falconer even though
the court recognized that Falconer is contrary to Texas law); Falconer, No. 89-2216, slip op.
at 8-9 (5th Cir. Sept 12, 1989) (oral agreement of employment for as long as the employee
"obeyed the company rules and did his job" barred by the statute of frauds); Rodriguez,
716 F. Supp. at 277 (interpreting Texas law) (oral agreement of employment so long as
employee performed satisfactorily violates statute of frauds); Wal-Mart Stores, 829 S.W.2d
at 342-43 (holding oral promise of job for "as long as I wanted it and made a good hand"
barred by statute of limitations).
79. Goodyear Tire, 836 S.W.2d at 669-70; McRae, 450 S.W.2d at 124; Hardison v. A. H.
Belo Corp., 247 S.W.2d 167, 168-69 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1952, no writ); see also Ford
Motor Co., 690 S.W.2d at 91-93 (plaintiff stated cause of action for breach of express em-
ployment contract by alleging that his at-will status was modified by oral agreements with
1997] 1115
SMU LAW REVIEW
Circuit. Hopefully, the Texas Supreme Court will have the opportunity to
resolve the confusion in the near future.
In Young v. Ward,80 Geoffrey Young sought to enforce an oral contract
with his former employer, Travis Ward, whereby Ward had allegedly
agreed to pay Young a pension of $2,000 per month for the rest of
Young's life. Ward contended that he agreed to pay Young $2,000 per
month for eight years from the date that Young retired. Concluding that
the alleged oral contract was unenforceable under the statute of frauds,
the trial court granted summary judgment to Ward. 81 The court of ap-
peals disagreed and reversed. 82 Construing the facts in the light most
favorable to Young, the court found that Ward had offered to pay Young
$2,000 per month for the rest of Young's life if Young would continue to
work until the end of October 1985.83 "[I]n the absence of a known date
when performance will be completed, the statute of frauds does not apply
if performance could conceivably be completed within one year of the
agreement's making. '"84
Furthermore, agreements not dependent on any condition to continue,
which require indefinite duration of performance, do not require a writ-
ing because the agreements could conceivably be performed within a year
of their making.85 "[A]greements to last during the lifetime of one of the
parties would also not require a writing because the party upon whose life
the duration of the contract is measured could die within a year of the
agreement's making."' 86 Applying these principles, the court concluded
that the oral agreement to pay Young $2,000 per month for the rest of his
life obviously could have been performed within a year of its making be-
cause Young could have died at any time after he stopped working for
Ward. 87 Further, Young's death would have caused the agreement to
have been fully performed, not merely fortuitously terminated. 88 Upon
holding that oral lifetime contracts are enforceable, the court reversed
the judgment of the trial court and remanded for a new trial on the
merits.89
supervisory personnel that he would not be terminated except for good cause and that his
employment would continue so long as his work was satisfactory).
80. 917 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. App.-Waco 1996, no writ).
81. Id. at 507.
82. Id. at 508.
83. Id. at 512.
84. Id. at 509.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 510. The court did, however, note that the mere possibility of performance
within a year does not necessarily mean a writing is not required if the possibility of per-
formance is dependent upon some merely fortuitous event. Id. at 510-511. Even if the
agreement contemplates the occurrence of an event that would terminate the agreement
before full performance, the statute of frauds still applies. Only the possibility of perform-
ance, not termination, of the agreement within a year would be enough to take the agree-
ment outside of the statute of frauds. Id. at 511.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 512.
89. Id.
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In Montgomery County Hospital,90 Valerie Brown opposed the defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment, asserting that prior to and during
her employment, she was orally promised by the hospital's administrator
that as long as she performed her job satisfactorily, she would have a job
and would not be fired except for good cause. The court held that such
representations would constitute an oral modification of the at-will doc-
trine.91 The court reasoned that an oral agreement not to fire an em-
ployee unless good cause exists is a valid modification of an employee's
at-will status and does not violate the statute of frauds, as it may be per-
formed within one year.92 In addition to creating a fact issue as to
whether an oral modification of her at-will status existed, Brown, because
she alleged she was not terminated for cause, had also created a fact issue
as to whether the alleged oral contract had been breached. 93
In Schultz,94 Kevin Schultz sued Academy for wrongful termination of
employment in breach of an alleged oral employment contract. Schultz
contended that there was an oral agreement to terminate him only for
good cause. Schultz based this claim on the deposition testimony of
Schultz's supervisor and district manager, who each stated their opinions
that the dismissal policies of Academy required good cause before an
employee could be discharged. Schultz also contended that his supervi-
sors told him that employees could not be terminated unless good cause
existed. The trial court granted Academy's motion for summary judg-
ment, and Schultz appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's judgment, finding there was no evidence to raise a fact question as
to the existence of an agreement to modify the at-will status.95 In so do-
ing the court relied on the employer's termination policy which provided
that management could, "without notice discharge employees for reduc-
tion in force, any violation of rule, law, or other reason." 96 The court
reasoned that where the policy manual is made a part of the summary
judgment evidence, it is subject to the court's interpretation as a matter of
law, and the interpretation of that writing by Schultz's supervisors was
immaterial.97 Accordingly, the court concluded that the supervisors' tes-
timony did not create an oral contract or a fact issue precluding summary
judgment. 98
In San Miguel v. City of Laredo,99 Victor San Miguel sued the City of
Laredo for breach of contract following his termination for inadequate
90. 929 S.W.2d 577; see also supra notes 54-57, infra notes 107-08, and accompanying
text.
91. Montgomery County Hosp., 929 S.W.2d at 584.
92. Id. at 584-585.
93. Id. at 585.
94. 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 2321; see also supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
95. Id. at *34.
96. Id.
97. Id. at *4.
98. Id.
99. No. 04-95-00627-CV, 1996 WL 269466 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ)
(not released for publication).
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job performance as a Laredo Bridge toll collector. San Miguel claimed
that he had an oral yearly contract in which he was assured that his em-
ployment would continue as long as his performance was satisfactory,
based on an annual evaluation. The appellate court upheld the trial
court's granting of motion for summary judgment for the city, finding that
San Miguel was an employee-at-will.' 0 0 Other than his own conclusory
statement of a yearly oral contract, no evidence existed of any contract
between the city and San Miguel. 101 Indeed, the Personnel Policies Man-
ual of the city expressly stated that all employees are employees-at-
will.' 0 2
In Cortinas,03 George Cortinas alleged that Kaiser management orally
promised him that he would not be fired for any reasons involving his
tenure as purchasing manager and that he would be starting on a clean
slate. Cortinas claimed that the comments by Kaiser management consti-
tuted oral statements creating a cause of action for breach of an employ-
ment contract. The court, however, did not resolve whether or not an
oral modification limiting Kaiser's right to terminate Cortinas at-will had
been made because Kaiser had decided to fire Cortinas in part because of
reasons unrelated to Cortinas' stint as purchasing manager. 1' 4 The court
reasoned that even if Kaiser was contractually prevented from firing Cor-
tinas based on his prior performance as purchasing manager, Kaiser did
not breach that contract by firing Cortinas for unrelated reasons. 0 5
Therefore, the court affirmed the award of summary judgment on Cor-
tinas' breach of contract claim.106
3. Estoppel
In Montgomery County Hospital,10 7 Valerie Brown sued Montgomery
County Hospital alleging she was constructively discharged. A dispute
arose as to the nature of payments received by Brown from Montgomery
for the period of time between her last day worked and the effective date
of Brown's termination. Montgomery alleged that Brown was estopped
from claiming constructive discharge because she knowingly accepted
benefits from her voluntary resignation in the form of severance pay.
Brown asserted that at no time was she told the payment was severance
pay nor did the paycheck stub reflect such a designation. The court held
that Brown's evidence was sufficient to raise a fact issue as to "whether or
not Brown's last paycheck included an amount for unworked severance
100. Id. at *2.
101. Id.
102. Id. at *1.
103. 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 7777. For a discussion of the facts of Cortinas, see text
accompanying supra notes 48-53. See also text accompanying infra notes 192-97.
104. Id. at *5.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 929 S.W.2d 577. For additional discussions of Montgomery County Hosp., see
supra notes 54-57 and 90-93 regarding allegations of oral and written modifications to em-
ployment-at-will.
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pay (or was only for monies due her pursuant to hospital policy) and if so,
whether Brown knowingly accepted it as a severance pay check" so as to
effect an estoppel of her constructive discharge claim.' 08
4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Under Texas law, to prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress,1' 9 the Texas Supreme Court 10 and courts of ap-
peals,"' the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals," 2 and the federal district
108. Montgomery County Hosp., 929 S.W.2d at 583.
109. The Texas Supreme Court has specifically rejected the tort of negligent infliction
of emotional distress. Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 594 (Tex. 1993); see also Rios, 930
S.W.2d at 816; Daigle v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 893 S.W.2d 121, 122 (Houston [1st Dist.]
1994, writ dism'd by agr.); Farrington, 865 S.W.2d at 247. For cases holding that no cause
of action exists for negligent infliction of emotional distress in the employment context,
see, e.g., Brunnemann v. Terra Int'l, Inc., 975 F.2d 175, 180-81 (5th Cir. 1992); Conaway v.
Control Data Corp., 955 F.2d 358, 361 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 864 (1992); Dade v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 942 F. Supp. 312, 320 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Wagner v. Texas A&M
Univ., 939 F. Supp. 1297, 1325 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Geise v. Neiman-Marcus Group, Inc., No.
H-91-2703 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 1993); White v. H.S. Fox Corp., No. 3:92-CV-0628-H (N.D.
Tex. Jan. 14, 1993); Clayton v. Nabisco Brands, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 882, 886 (S.D. Tex. 1992);
Soro v. City of Laredo, 764 F. Supp. 454, 457 (S.D. Tex. 1991), Taylor, 756 F. Supp. at 301-
02. Additionally, if an employee's emotional distress claim arises during the course and
scope of his employment and the employer is a subscriber under the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act, the employee's claim for emotional distress is barred by the Act and his remedy is
for workers' compensation benefits under the Act. Schauer v. Memorial Care Sys., 856
S.W.2d 437, 452 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ); McAlister, 830 S.W.2d at
662.
110. Randall's Food Mkts. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995); Wornick Co. v.
Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex. 1993) (observing that in Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d
619, 621 (Tex. 1993) the Texas Supreme Court adopted the elements of the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress as set forth in the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
§ 46 (1965)); Diamond Shamrock Ref. and Mktg. Co. v. Mendez, 844 S.W.2d 198,200 (Tex.
1992).
111. E.g., Rios, 930 S.W.2d 809; Kemp v. Southern Methodist Univ., No. 05-95-00650-
CV (Tex. App.-Dallas, Apr. 4, 1996, writ denied) (not designated for publication), 1996
WL 156891, at *2; Beiser, 902 S.W.2d at 725; Kelly v. Stone, 898 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. App.-
Eastland 1995, writ denied); Lee v. Levi Strauss & Co., 897 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1995, no writ); Bhalli v. Methodist Hosp., 896 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1995, writ denied); Washington, 893 S.W.2d 309; DeMoranville v. Specialty Retailers,
Inc., 909 S.W.2d 90,94-95 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ requested); Nayef v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 895 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no writ);
Cot, 894 S.W.2d at 542; Shaheen v. Motion Indus., Inc., 880 S.W.2d 88, 92 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied); Garcia v. Andrews, 867 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1993, no writ); Reeves v. Western Co. of N. Am., 867 S.W. 2d 385 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1993, writ denied); Farrington, 865 S.W.2d 247; Qualicare v. Runnels, 863 S.W.2d
220 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1993, writ dism'd); Schauer, 856 S.W.2d 437; Amador, 855
S.W.2d 131; Hennigan v. I.P. Petroleum Co., 848 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App.-Beaumont),
rev'd on other grounds, 858 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. 1993); Benavides v. Moore, 848 S.W.2d 190
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).
112. See, e.g., Weller v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., 84 F.3d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S.Ct. 682 (1997); Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 1996); MacArthur
v. University of Tex. Health Ctr., 45 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 1995); Hadley v. Van, P.T.S., 44 F.3d
372, 375 (5th Cir. 1995); Grizzle v. Travelers Health Network, Inc., 14 F.3d 261, 269 n.28
(5th Cir. 1994); Danawala v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 4 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1993);
McKethan v. Texas Farm Bureau, 996 F.2d 734, 742 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
694 (1994); Chance v. Rice Univ., 984 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1993); Ugalde v. W.A. McKenzie
Asphalt Co., 990 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1993); Johnson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
965 F.2d 31, 33 (5th Cir. 1992); Ramirez v. Allright Parking El Paso, Inc., 970 F.2d 1372,
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courts 1 3 have consistently required plaintiffs to establish a level of con-
duct that is "extreme and outrageous" as that term is defined in the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. 114 Whether conduct "is extreme and
outrageous" is a question of law for the court. 115 As predicted by Justice
Hecht in Wornick Co. v. Casas, the supreme court's failure to articulate
any principles for concluding what behavior constitutes "extreme and
outrageous" conduct has resulted in inconsistent results by the courts of
appeals, particularly in summary judgment cases. 1' 6 Justice Hecht's con-
clusion is demonstrated by a review of the numerous decisions in this
area.
In Castro v. Hyatt Corp.,117 Maria Castro appealed from an award of
summary judgment granted to Hyatt Corp. (Hyatt) on her claim of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress related to her efforts to return to
employment following a work-related injury absence. After she had been
absent from work for over a year, Hyatt sent Castro a letter informing
her that she had failed to request an extension of her leave, that she was
considered as a "voluntary quit," and that she was administratively termi-
1375 (5th Cir. 1992); Guthrie, 941 F. 2d at 379; Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d
1138, 1143 (5th Cir. 1991).
113. Dade, 942 F. Supp. 312; Wagner, 939 F. Supp. 1297; Hockaday, 914 F. Supp. 1439;
Scott v. City of Dallas, 876 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Tex. 1995); Gearhart v. Eye Care Ctrs. of
Am., 888 F. Supp. 814, 823 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Fulford v. The Upjohn Co., No. 3:94-CV-0684-
P (N.D. Tex. filed Feb 23, 1995); McCray v. DPC Indus., Inc., 875 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Tex.
1995); Smith v. Block Drug Co., No. H-92-243 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 1994); Clayton, 804 F.
Supp. at 882; Garcia v. Webb, 764 F. Supp. 457, 460 (S.D. Tex. 1991); Taylor, 756 F. Supp.
at 301; Guzman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 756 F. Supp. 994, 1002 (W.D. Tex. 1990).
114. Liability for outrageous conduct exists
only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme
in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded
as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the
case in which outrageous conduct is found is one in which the recitation of
the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resent-
ment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, "Outrageous!".
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
Liability does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances,
petty oppression, or other trivialities .... The rough edges of our society are
still in need of a good deal of filing down, and in the meantime plaintiffs must
necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of
rough language, and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and
unkind. There is no occasion for the law to intervene in every case where
someone's feelings are hurt. There must still be freedom to express an un-
flattering opinion, and some safety valve must be left through which irascible
tempers may blow off relatively harmless steam.
Id.
115. Wornick, 856 S.W.2d at 736 (Hecht, J., concurring).
116. Justice Hecht wrote:
With the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Court em-
barks on what I predict will be an endless wandering over a sea of factual
circumstances, meandering this way and that, blown about by bias and incli-
nation, and guided by nothing steadier than the personal preferences of the
helmsmen, who change with every watch.
Id. at 737 (Hecht, J., concurring).
117. No. 05-95-00651-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas June 26, 1996, no writ) (not designated
for publication), 1996 WL 348178. For an additional discussion of Castro, see text accom-
panying infra notes 389-92.
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nated because she remained on leave for more than 180 days. Several
days later Castro provided Hyatt with a note releasing her to work with
no restrictions. Hyatt told her that she had been removed from the pay-
roll but was eligible to reapply.
Asserting Castro's failure to adduce evidence of outrageous or extreme
conduct or any severe emotional distress, Hyatt moved for and was
granted summary judgment by the trial court on Castro's claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. 118 Castro attempted to counter
with allegations that when she returned to work with light duty restric-
tions, Hyatt would not assign her light duty work, refused her request for
medical leave, refused to allow her to go home, and threatened to fire her
if she did not do heavy work or if she requested a leave to go home.119
The court held that even if these allegations were true, they amounted to,
at most, "mere indignities and petty oppressions.' ' 120 Based on this evi-
dence, the court found that Hyatt's conduct was not extreme or outra-
geous, nor was Castro's emotional distress severe.' 2 ' As a result, the trial
court's award of summary judgment was found to be entirely proper.' 22
In Bonenberger v. Continental Insurance Co.,123 Donna Bonenberger
claimed that the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment to
Continental Rehabilitation Resources, Inc. (CRR) on her claim of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. CRR had fired Bonenberger for
what it viewed as misconduct on her part while reviewing patient records
at a hospital in Texarkana. Bonenberger asserted that in a meeting with
her boss, Augustine Dueno, at which seven other employees were pres-
ent, Dueno responded to a question by Bonenberger as to whether they
were to have such meetings every month by shouting at Bonenberger that
he was tired of Bonenberger challenging his authority and that
Bonenberger was determined to be disruptive. Bonenberger also stated
that she was afraid that Dueno would strike her, although Dueno never
struck her or any other employee. Bonenberger also felt Dueno's atti-
tude was menacing and frightening. The court held that such conduct was
not so outrageous or extreme as to go beyond all bounds of decency, 124
and the employee's termination itself cannot constitute the outrageous
conduct necessary to prove intentional infliction of emotional distress. 25
Because Bonenberger had failed to raise a fact issue as to intentional
infliction of emotional distress, the trial court's award of summary judg-
ment was affirmed. 26





123. No. 05-95-01055-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas July 29, 1996, no writ) (not designated for
publication), 1996 WL 429299. For an additional discussion of Bonenberger, see text ac-
companying infra notes 270-76, 308-10.
124. Id. at *8.
125. Id. at *7-8.
126. Id. at *8.
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In Atkinson v. Denton Publishing Co. ,127 Franklin Atkinson, a circula-
tion manager for the Denton Record-Chronicle, sued Denton Publishing
Company for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district
court granted summary judgment as to Atkinson's intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim. Atkinson alleged that he was terminated with-
out warning after a period of long service, that defamatory and false rea-
sons for his firing had been published to people inside the company, that
his superiors were rude or disrespectful to him while he was working at
the paper and in the termination meeting, and that as a result, he exper-
ienced grief, shame, humiliation, anger, depression, and nausea. The
Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment, not-
ing that virtually all of Atkinson's allegations were typical of an ordinary
employment dispute.128 The alleged conduct was neither extreme nor
outrageous and therefore, as a matter of law, did not rise to the level of
intentional infliction of emotional distress.129
In Wilson,130 Mia Wilson brought suit against Sysco complaining of
various incidents involving her former supervisor, Carroll Bonneau. Bon-
neau allegedly made numerous sexual advances toward Wilson, con-
stantly made comments of a sexual nature, made advances towards
Wilson's mother, suggested that Wilson sleep with clients, and repri-
manded Wilson for refusing to sleep with a client. Wilson feared that she
would lose her job if she complained of Bonneau's behavior, particularly
since Bonneau had the authority to alter her sales figures and to change
her sales territory and accounts. Wilson was eventually terminated for
poor performance. She then sued for intentional infliction of emotional
distress based on these incidents. The court noted the requirement for
extreme or outrageous conduct and stated that even actions that may be
illegal in an employment context may not constitute the extreme and out-
rageous conduct necessary to prove intentional infliction of emotional
distress.' 3 ' Finding the conduct at issue no more egregious than other
conduct held to be neither extreme nor outrageous, the court held Bon-
neau's harassing conduct and Sysco's decision to terminate Wilson did
not establish the degree of reprehensibility necessary for a claim of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.' 32
In Munoz v. H&M Wholesale, Inc.,133 Joe Munoz and his wife sued
H&M Wholesale, Inc. (H&M) for, among other things, intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. Munoz was terminated from his job as an oil
delivery driver with H&M after sustaining a back injury. The court
granted H&M's motion for summary judgment on the claim for inten-
127. 84 F.3d 144 (5th Cir. 1996).
128. Id. at 151.
129. Id.
130. 940 F. Supp. 1003. See also supra notes 24-28, infra notes 235-40 and accompany-
ing text.
131. Id. at 1013.
132. Id.
133. 926 F. Supp. 596 (S.D. Tex. 1996). For an additional discussion of Munoz, see text
accompanying infra notes 402-03.
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tional infliction of emotional distress, reasoning that the Munozes in es-
sence complained of the termination of Mr. Munoz's employment. The
court noted that many people faced with unemployment have complaints
similar to those experienced by Munoz and his wife.134 The court ex-
plained that in an employment dispute it was highly unusual for an em-
ployer's behavior to reach the extreme and outrageous level required for
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.135 The court added
that under Texas law, even if the employer knows that terminating an
employee will cause emotional distress, termination alone is not enough
to constitute outrageous behavior. As a matter of law, an employer can-
not be liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress solely for "ex-
ercising its legal right to terminate an employee.' 36 The court explained
that Mr. Munoz did not allege that he was degraded, insulted, or treated
with disrespect. 137 The court concluded that H&M's conduct falls short
of the level of extreme and outrageous conduct needed to establish liabil-
ity for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Texas law. 138
The court also concluded that the Munozes failed to show that any
emotional distress they suffered was severe. 39 The court noted that
while the Munozes asserted that they suffered from anxiety and depres-
sion, they did not claim that they experienced any psychiatric problems,
debilitating headaches, or post-traumatic stress syndrome. The court con-
cluded that the Munozes claimed emotional distress was not "so severe
that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it,'1 4 and that
summary judgment was, therefore, appropriate as to the Munozes' claims
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.14'
In Smith v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,142 Paul Smith was terminated from his
position as a sales representative for Ciba-Geigy Corp. (Ciba). Smith
sued Ciba for, among other things, intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, claiming that Ciba's manner of terminating his employment was ex-
treme and outrageous. Smith alleged that Ciba called Smith to a meeting
in New Orleans, then handed him a letter and fired him. Smith further
complained that he was terminated ten days before Christmas, in an air-
port, in another city, and for discriminatory reasons. In granting Ciba's
motion for summary judgment, the court reasoned that while Smith al-
leged Ciba acted with the conscious intent of aggravating Smith's obses-
sive-compulsive disorder (OCD), almost all of the conduct of which
Smith complained occurred before Ciba knew that Smith suffered from
OCD. 143 Further, the court concluded that all of the conduct that took






140. Id. at 613 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j).
141. Id.
142. No. H-94-2381, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11182 (S.D. Tex. May 23, 1996).
143. Id. at *10-11.
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place appeared to be related to an ordinary employment dispute and did
not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct. 144
5. Drug Testing
No significant drug testing employment cases have been decided in
Texas since the 1995 Texas Supreme Court decision in SmithKline
Beacham Corp. v. Doe.'45 In SmithKline, a job offer was withdrawn after
the prospective employee, Jane Doe, tested positive in her pre-employ-
ment drug screening test. Doe sued the prospective employer and the
laboratory that conducted the drug test. Issues included negligence,
breach of contract and tortious interference with contract. SmithKline
ultimately rejected the breach of contract and negligence claims, finding
no duty existed to warn either the prospective employee, or the employer
that eating poppy seeds will cause a positive drug test. Based upon a fact
dispute, the issue of tortious interference was remanded to the trial court
by the court of appeals and affirmed by the supreme court.
6. Defamation
Defamation under Texas law is "a defamatory statement orally commu-
nicated or published to a third person without legal excuse. 1 46 A court
must make the threshold determination of whether the complained of
statement or publication 147 is capable of conveying a defamatory mean-
ing.148 In making this determination, the court construes the statement
"as a whole, in light of the surrounding circumstances, considering how a
person of ordinary intelligence would understand the statement."' 149
144. Id. at *11.
145. 903 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1995); see also W. Wendall Hall et al., Employment and La-
bor Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 49 SMU L. REV. 939, 961-63 (1996) [hereinafter
Hall, 1996 Annual Survey].
146. Crum, 946 F.2d at 428 (applying Texas law) (quoting Ramos, 711 S.W.2d at 333).
Libel is defined in TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Vernon 1986), as a
statement:
that tends to blacken the memory of the dead or that tends to injure a living
person's reputation and thereby expose the person to public hatred, con-
tempt or ridicule, or financial injury or to impeach any person's honesty, in-
tegrity, virtue, or reputation or to publish the natural defects of anyone and
thereby expose the person to public hatred, ridicule, or financial injury.
147. Marshall Field Stores, Inc. v. Gardiner, 859 S.W.2d 391, 400 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1993, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (where the circumstantial evidence could lead to two
conclusions: one, that the employer published the information to the employees; or, two,
that the employees learned the information from gossip resulting from the events sur-
rounding the termination, the court held that the circumstantial evidence did not support
the jury's verdict of defamation because both conclusions were equally likely).
148. Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1989) (citing Musser v. Smith Protective
Serv. Inc., 723 S.W.2d 653, 654-55 (Tex. 1987)); Eskew v. Plantation Foods, Inc., 905 S.W.
2d 461, 463-64 (Tex. App.-Waco 1995, no writ) (member of a group has no cause of action
for a defamatory statement directed toward some or less than all of the group, when noth-
ing singles out plaintiff, court observed that the defamation libel must refer to some ascer-
tained or ascertainable person).
149. See Carr, 776 S.W.2d at 570; Musser, 723 S.W.2d at 655; Fitzjarrald v. Panhandle
Publishing Co., 149 Tex. 87, 96, 228 S.W.2d 499, 504 (1950). See McKethan, 996 F.2d at 743
(evidence showed that there had been teasing and laughter at a convention, and that under
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Only when the court determines the language is ambiguous or of doubtful
import should a jury determine the statement's meaning and the effect of
the statement on an ordinary reader.1 50 The courts have also held that a
former employer's refusal to discuss with a prospective employer the rea-
sons or circumstances surrounding an employee's termination does not
constitute defamation. 151 Of course, if the communication is true, that is
an absolute defense to the defamation claim. 1
52
a. The Doctrine of Self-Publication
Generally, in the employment context, publication of defamation oc-
curs when an employer communicates to a third party a defamatory state-
ment about a former employee. The doctrine of self-publication provides
that publication also occurs when an individual is compelled to publish
defamatory statements in response to inquiries of prospective employers,
and the former employer should have foreseen that compulsion. 153 Un-
the circumstances of a festive awards banquet, considering the nature of the remarks, and
the employee's reputation as an outstanding district sales manager; the court concluded
that a "person of ordinary intelligence would not have attributed a defamatory meaning to
the remarks"); Crum, 946 F.2d at 429 (announcing to staff that employee is on leave until
an industrial psychologist-management consultant conducting an organizational investiga-
tion reported the results of his investigation could not be construed as an allegation of
mental disturbance).
150. See Carr, 776 S.W.2d at 570; Musser, 723 S.W.2d at 655; Denton Publishing Co. v.
Boyd, 460 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Tex. 1970). Frank B. Hall & Co. v. Buck, 678 S.W.2d 612, 618-
19 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1009
(1985) illustrates how a statement that may not appear defamatory may be construed as
defamatory by a jury. In Buck, a prospective new employer of Buck telephoned Hall &
Co. to learn about the circumstances surrounding Buck's termination. One of Hall & Co.'s
employees stated that Buck hadn't reached his production goals. When pressed for more
information, the employee declined to comment. The prospective employer then asked if
the company would rehire Buck, and the employee answered no. The prospective em-
ployer testified that because of the company's employee's comments, he was unwilling to
extend an offer of employment. Buck sued his former employer for defamation of charac-
ter alleging that Hall & Co. employees made defamatory statements about him during the
course of telephone conversations with Buck's prospective employers. The jury found in
favor of Buck. The company appealed the jury determination that the alleged statements
were defamatory and argued that the words were susceptible to a nondefamatory interpre-
tation because Buck was never explicitly accused of any wrongdoing nor was he called
anything disparaging. The court disagreed and concluded that there was evidence suffi-
cient to show that the prospective employer understood the statements made by the de-
fendant's employee in a defamatory sense. Because the statements were ambiguous, the
court held that the jury was entitled to find that the company's statements were calculated
to convey that Buck had been terminated because of serious misconduct. Id. at 619.
151. Bernard v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., No. 01-92-00134-CV (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] Oct. 20, 1994, writ denied) (not designated for publication), 1994 WL 575520
(former supervisors held not to have a duty to talk to prospective employer); American
Medical Int'l Inc. v. Giurintano, 821 S.W.2d 331, 337 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1991, no writ) (former employer has no duty to talk to anyone about a former employee).
152. Randall's, 891 S.W.2d at 640; Washington, 893 S.W.2d at 312 (communication of
results of drug test to employee's supervisors was a truthful communication, therefore, it
was not actionable).
153. See Howard J. Seigel, Self-Publication: Defamation Within the Employment Con-
text, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1 (1994) (reviewing the rules and reasoning of various jurisdictions
that permit defamation actions supported by self-publication); Diane H. Mazur, Note, Self-
Publication of Defamation and Employee Discharge, 6 Rnv. LrrIG. 313, 314 (1987). Two
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like other jurisdictions, Texas does not analyze the circumstances in terms
of whether the facts compelled the former employee to repeat the defa-
mation,154 focusing instead on the foreseeability that the defamatory
statements be communicated to a third party.155 Where, however, an em-
ployer successfully asserts the underlying statements are protected by a
qualified privilege, with insufficient evidence of malice to defeat the privi-
lege, at least one court has concluded no defamation occurs, precluding
the necessity of addressing the issue of compelled self-publication.156
In Rios,157 David Rios was employed as an assistant vice president and
commercial loan officer for TCB. While employed in the loan workout
department, Rios met with a client to discuss her declined loan applica-
tion. During the meeting, Rios allegedly disclosed to the client informa-
tion contained in the credit bureau reports, despite specific company
policy prohibiting such disclosure. The supervisor of the loan workout
department, upon discovering that Rios had violated company policy, dis-
cases in Texas have recognized the doctrine of self-publication. Chasewood Constr. Co. v.
Rico, 696 S.W.2d 439, 445 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (court held it
was reasonable to expect that contractor dismissed from project for theft would be re-
quired to repeat reason to others); First State Bank v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696, 701 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (court held it was reasonable to expect that
former bank employee discharged for dishonesty would be required to admit in employ-
ment interview or in application for employment about same). See Purcell v. Seguin State
Bank and Trust Co., 999 F.2d 950, 959 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Chasewood and Ake, the court
observed that Texas courts recognize the narrow exception of self-compelled defamation);
see also Hardwick v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 881 S.W.2d 195, 199 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1994, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (court recognized Ake but declined to address issue
because case reversed on other grounds); Reeves, 867 S.W.2d at 395 (observing that the
self-defamation doctrine has not been recognized by all the Texas courts).
154. See McKinney v. Santa Clara County, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89, 94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980);
Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336, 1343 (Colo. 1988); Belcher v. Little, 315
N.W.2d 734, 737 (Iowa 1982); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876,
895 (Minn. 1986) (the following must be proven for a finding that a statement is self-com-
pelled: (1) a strong compulsion to disclose the defamatory statement to third parties exists;
(2) the existence of the strong compulsion was reasonably foreseeable to the wrongdoer;
and (3) such disclosure was actually made).
155. Chasewood, 696 S.W.2d at 445-46; Ake, 606 S.W.2d at 701. The Texas courts' rec-
ognition of the doctrine of self-publication is based upon comment k of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 (1977). Comment k provides:
k. Intentional or negligent publication. There is an intent to publish defam-
atory matter when the actor does an act for the purpose of communicating it
to a third person or with knowledge that it is substantially certain to be so
communicated ....
It is not necessary, however, that the communication to a third person be
intentional. If a reasonable person would recognize that an act creates an
unreasonable risk that the defamatory matter will be communicated to a
third person, the conduct becomes a negligent communication. A negligent
communication amounts to a publication just as effectively as an intentional
communication.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 cmt. k (1977). See Reeves, 867 S.W.2d at 395
(employee's speculation about possible consequences if prospective employers learned
that he failed the alcohol test did not support his defamation claim).
156. Duffy v. Leading Edge Prod., Inc., 44 F.3d 308, 312-14, n.5 (5th Cir. 1995).
157. 930 S.W.2d at 809. See also supra notes 42-47, infra notes 304-07, 452-58 and ac-
companying text.
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closed the violation to the bank president, which resulted in Rios's termi-
nation. Rios then sued TCB for defamation, alleging that he was
compelled to publish to third parties a false reason for his discharge. The
trial court granted TCB's motion for summary judgment, and Rios ap-
pealed. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, reason-
ing that the statement at issue was not defamatory because it was true. 158
The court explained that in Rios's deposition, Rios admitted to reading
information from the credit report to the TCB client and admitted that,
prior to the meeting with the client, he knew the bank's policy forbidding
such disclosure.159
b. Absolute Privilege
Any communication, oral or written, which is uttered or published in
the course of or in contemplation of a judicial proceeding is absolutely
privileged. 160 No action for damages will lie for such communication
even though it is false and published with malice.161 The privilege has
also been extended to proceedings before executive officers, boards, and
commissions exercising quasi-judicial powers162 and to governmental em-
ployees exercising discretionary functions.' 63 Examples of quasi-judicial
bodies include the State Bar Grievance Committee, a grand jury, the
Railroad Commission, the Pharmacy Board, the Internal Affairs Division
of the Police Department of Dallas,164 and the Texas Employment
Commission. 165
A communication by an employer about a former employee may also
be absolutely privileged if the employee authorized the communica-
tion.166 When a plaintiff consents to a publication, the defendant is abso-
lutely privileged to make it even if it proves to be defamatory.167 Texas
follows the general rule that if a plaintiff complains about a publication
which he "consented to, authorized, invited or procured, by the plaintiff,
he cannot recover for injuries sustained as a result of the publication.' 168
158. Id. at 817.
159. Id.
160. James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914, 916-17 (Tex. 1982).
161. Reagan v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 140 Tex. 105, 109, 166 S.W.2d 909, 912 (1942).
162. Id. at 912; Hardwick, 881 S.W.2d at 198.
163. Brooks v. Scherler, 859 S.W.2d 586,588 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no
writ).
164. Putter v. Anderson, 601 S.W.2d 73, 77 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
165. Taylor, 756 F. Supp. at 303; Hardwick, 881 S.W.2d at 198; Krenek v. Abel, 594
S.W.2d 821, 822 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ).
166. Smith v. Holley, 827 S.W.2d 433, 436 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied).
167. Id. at 436 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 (1977)).
168. Id. at 437 (citing Lyle v. Waddle, 144 Tex. 90, 188 S.W.2d 770, 772 (1945)); see
Jones v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 979 F.2d 1004,1007 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying Texas law
the court held that plaintiff waived state law libel claim based on a defendant's publication
of a memorandum to the school district where plaintiff released the defendants from liabil-
ity for information they provided to the district); Hooper v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 895 S.W.2d
773, 778 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, writ denied) (employee consented to defamation
when she asked employer to investigate her motivational techniques). But see Buck, supra
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In other words, the consent privilege applies when a plaintiff gives refer-
ences for a prospective employer to contact, and the former employer
makes defamatory statements. 169 While there is some uncertainty
whether consent creates an absolute privilege or simply makes the defa-
mation not actionable, the distinction is irrelevant because the result is
the same.170
c. An Employer's Qualified Privilege
An employer will not be liable if the statement is published under cir-
cumstances that make it conditionally privileged and if the privilege is not
abused.171 "Whether a qualified privilege exists is a question of law."'172
"A qualified privilege comprehends communication made in good faith
on subject matter in which the author has an interest or with reference to
which he has an interest or with reference to which he has a duty, to
perform to another person having a corresponding interest or duty."'1 73
Generally, defamatory statements by an employer about an employee, or
former employee, to a person having a common interest in the matter to
which the communication relates, such as a prospective employer, are
qualifiedly privileged. 174
An employer may lose the qualified privilege if his communication or
note 150, recognizing the stated concept but finding no consent, invitation or authorization
where former employee had no reason to believe former employer and employer's agents
would defame employee by accusations which "were not mere expressions of opinion but
were false and derogatory statements of fact." Buck, 678 S.W.2d at 617-18.
169. Smith v. Holley, 827 S.W.2d 433,437 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied)
(citing 2 F. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.17 at 138-39 (2d ed. 1986)).
170. Id. at 437-38. The court noted that the RESTATEMENT and other treatises conclude
that consent creates an absolute privilege. Id. at 437 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 583; PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 114; HARPER, supra note 169). The Texas
cases seem to suggest that consent simply makes the defamation not actionable. Id. at 438(citing Lyle, 188 S.W.2d at 772; Duncantell v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 446 S.W.2d 934, 937
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Mayfield v. Gleichert, 437
S.W.2d 638, 642 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969, no writ); Wilks v. DeBolt, 211 S.W.2d 589,
590 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1948, no writ)).
171. Boze v. Branstetter, 912 F.2d 801, 806 (5th Cir. 1990); Gaines v. CUNA Mut. Ins.
Soc'y, 681 F.2d 982, 986 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Bergman v. Oshman's Sporting Goods, Inc.,
594 S.W.2d 814, 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no writ)); Butler v. Central Bank & Trust
Co., 458 S.W.2d 510, 514-15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, writ dism'd); Houston v. Gro-
cers Supply Co., 625 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ);
Duncantell, 446 S.W.2d at 936; see Washington, 893 S.W.2d at 309 (truth of statements
regarding positive drug test made assertion of privilege unnecessary).
172. Boze, 912 F.2d at 806 (interpreting Texas law); Grocers Supply, 625 S.W.2d at 800(citing Oshman's Sporting Goods, 594 S.W.2d at 816); Mayfield, 484 S.W.2d at 626; Free v.
American Home Assurance Co., 902 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no
writ).
173. Boze, 912 F.2d at 806 (quoting Grocers Supply, 625 S.W.2d at 800); Randall's, 891
S.W.2d 640, 654; Washington, 893 S.W.2d at 312; see Pioneer Concrete, Inc. v. Allen, 858
S.W.2d 47, 50 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (quoting Kaplan v.
Goodfried, 497 S.W.2d 101,105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Da~las 1973, no writ); Holley, 827 S.W.2d
at 436; Duncantell, 446 S.W.2d at 937; HARPER, supra note 169 § 5.26 at 228.
174. Randall's, 891 S.W.2d at 654 (citing Butler, 458 S.W.2d at 514-15); Ramos, 711
S.W.2d at 335 (citing Grocers Supply, 625 S.W.2d at 800; Oshman's Sporting Goods, 594
S.W.2d at 816); Duncantell, 446 S.W.2d at 937.
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publication is accompanied by actual malice.175 In defamation cases, ac-
tual malice is separate and distinct from traditional common law mal-
ice. 176 Actual malice does not include ill will, spite or evil motive; rather,
it exists "when the statement is made with knowledge of its falsity or with
reckless disregard as to its truth."'1 77 Further, "'[r]eckless disregard' is
defined as a high degree of awareness of probable falsity, for proof of
which a plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion
that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his
publication.' 1 78 An error in judgment is not sufficient to show actual
malice.' 79
While the Texas cases adopting the doctrine of self-publication do not
address the issue of whether a qualified privilege exists in self-defamation
actions, 80 decisions in other jurisdictions which recognize the doctrine of
self-publication have recognized a qualified privilege in the employment
context.' 81 A federal district court in Texas has recognized that such a
175. Randall's, 891 S.W.2d at 654; Dixon v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 607 S.W.2d 240,
242 (Tex. 1980); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. O'Neil, 456 S.W.2d 896, 898 (Tex. 1970); Mara-
thon Oil Co. v. Salazar, 682 S.W.2d 624, 630-31 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Grocers Supply, 625 S.W.2d at 801; Bridges v. Farmer, 483 S.W.2d 939, 944
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, no writ). See Danawala, 4 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1993) (unau-
thorized gossip spread by unidentified co-workers does not take the defendants outside the
scope of the qualified privilege).
176. Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 558 (Tex. 1989); Carr, 776 S.W.2d at 571.
177. Randall's, 891 S.W.2d at 646 (citing Hagler v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 884
S.W.2d 771, 771-72 (Tex. 1994)); Carr, 776 S.W.2d at 571 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 328 (1974)); Casso, 776 S.W.2d 551, 558 (Tex. 1989).
178. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Odem, 929 S.W.2d 513, 525-26 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1996, writ requested); see Duffy, 44 F.3d 308 (complaints of inadequate investigation alone
do not show malice, even though investigation conducted as mere pretext for predeter-
mined decision may be some evidence of ulterior motive and might support claim of malice
in some circumstances); Carr, 776 S.W.2d at 571 (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S.
727, 731 (1968); Casso, 776 S.W.2d at 558). The plaintiff's evidence in response to a motion
for summary judgment must amount to more than a conclusion to create a fact issue. Mar-
tin v. Southwestern Elec. Power Co., 860 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993,
writ denied) (the plaintiff's response that "I know that most of the assertions made in the
letter about me are not true and, therefore: the letter must have been written based on
malice directed at me," held insufficient to create a fact issue); Schauer, 856 S.W.2d at 450
(court held that the plaintiff failed to present clear, positive and direct evidence of malice
to create a fact issue).
179. Hagler, 884 S.W.2d at 771.
180. See supra notes 146-52.
181. See, e.g., Steinbach v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 728 F. Supp. 1389, 1396 (D.
Minn. 1989) (Minnesota law recognizes a qualified privilege in the employer/employee re-
lationship if the statements were made in good faith); Churchey, 759 P.2d at 1347 (qualified
privilege recognized in the employer-employee context); Elmore v. Shell Oil Co., 733
F. Supp. 544, 546 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (recognizing existence of a qualified privilege); Lewis,
389 N.W.2d 876. In Lewis, the Minnesota Supreme Court correctly acknowledged the rea-
son for allowing the qualified privilege in self-publication cases:
Where an employer would be entitled to a privilege if it had actually pub-
lished the statement, it makes little sense to deny the privilege where the
identical communication is made to identical third parties with the only dif-
ference being the mode of publication. Finally, recognition of a qualified
privilege seems to be the only effective means of addressing the concern that
every time an employer states the reason for discharging an employee it will
subject itself to potential liability for defamation.
Id. at 889-90.
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privilege may exist in self-defamation actions; however, the court ren-
dered judgment on other grounds. 182
In Stephens v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp. ,183 Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp.
(Delhi) claimed that it terminated Stephens for violating the company's
conflict of interest policy in that he used a company employee to install a
gasket on Stephens' personal air compressor while on company time.
Stephens admitted that he did ask a company employee to install a gasket
for him, but stated that it was customary for Delhi employees to perform
small tasks for one another and that Delhi never before discharged any-
one for that reason. Following termination, Stephens filed suit against
Delhi for defamation. The trial court granted Delhi's motion for sum-
mary judgment, and Stephens appealed.
In support of his defamation claim, Stephens alleged that Delhi man-
agement defamed him by telling employees and non-employees that he
was fired for violating company policy. The court concluded that Delhi
published the statement, because it acknowledged that it passed informa-
tion about Stephens's firing on to certain managers. 184 The court also
concluded that because there was some question as to whether the con-
flict of interest policy was still in effect, there was a fact issue as to
whether Stephens violated a valid, operating policy, and thus whether the
truth defense was applicable. 185 The court also held that the statements
were defamatory. 186 Although Stephens failed to offer any firsthand
proof that anyone at the company called him a thief, as alleged, Delhi did
admit discussing the reasons for Stephens's termination with managers,
and the accusations involved violating company policies in ways that a
reasonable person could take as defamatory. 187 Furthermore, the court
held that Stephens' voluntary self-publication of the reasons for his dis-
charge to friends and confidants did not bar Stephens's slander claim,
where Stephens sought damages for publication of the defamatory infor-
mation to third parties not of his own choosing. 188 Furthermore, the
court concluded that the statements were not opinions protected by the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section
8 of the Texas Constitution, as Delhi managers made an assertion of fact,
not of opinion, when they stated that they terminated Stephens for violat-
ing company policy. 189
The court concluded, however, that the statements were protected by
the qualified privilege because Delhi gave the reasons for Stephens's fir-
182. Young v. Dow Chem. Co., No. H-90-1145, 1991 WL 138322, at *3 (S.D. Tex.
Apr. 5, 1991).
183. 924 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, writ requested). For an additional
discussion of Stephens, see text accompanying infra notes 407-11.
184. Id. at 769.
185. Id. at 770.
186. Id. at 773.
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ing only to company managers. 19° The court held that because Stephens
came forward with no evidence to show that Delhi acted with actual mal-
ice, Stephens failed to overcome the qualified privilege, and summary
judgment was appropriate as to Stephens's defamation claim. 191
In Cortinas,'92 George Cortinas worked for Kaiser in the purchasing
department. After investigating the purchasing department, Kaiser
found that "bid rigging, kickbacks, possible illegal drug sales, gambling,
and parties involving alcohol consumption and 'the presence of invited
women' had occurred in connection with the operation of the purchasing
department while it was under Cortinas's direction."'1 93 On the date of
Cortinas' termination, a member of Kaiser's management informed em-
ployees of the results of the investigation from which some employees got
the impression that Cortinas was to blame for the events. Cortinas also
alleged that slanderous statements were made about him in the course of
the company investigation and that he was defamed by the statements of
various management personnel to Kaiser employees that he was involved
in taking kickbacks.
Though he admitted that the defamatory statements made were subject
to a qualified privilege for communications made in the course of an in-
vestigation following a report of employee wrongdoing, Cortinas claimed
that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on his defama-
tion cause of action. Proof that a statement was motivated by actual mal-
ice would defeat the claim of privilege. Actual malice is shown when the
statement is made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard
as to its truth.194 To invoke the qualified privilege on summary judgment,
the employer must conclusively establish the absence of malice in the de-
famatory statement. 95 Cortinas alleged that while Kaiser had no first-
hand knowledge that he was involved in any wrongdoing, it had first-
hand knowledge through him that he had done nothing improper. The
court held that while Cortinas may dispute the accuracy of the employ-
ees' information, there was "support for all of appellees' statements in
the information Kaiser learned through its [investigation and] interviews
with purchasing department employees, and thus the statements were not
made with reckless disregard.' 96 As a result, the court held that Kaiser
had proved the statements were made with an absence of malice and af-
firmed the trial court's award of summary judgment. 197
In Wagner v. Texas A&M University, 98 Dr. Jackson Wagner was a pro-
fessor at Texas A&M University (A&M). After a long series of disagree-
190. Id. at 771.
191. Id.
192. 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 1111; see also supra notes 48-53, 103-06 and accompanying
text.
193. Id. at *1.
194. Id. at *6.
195. Id.
196. Id. at *7.
197. Id.
198. 939 F. Supp. 1297 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
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ments with Wagner, and following Wagner's filing of a lawsuit against
A&M and others, Dr. Elvin Smith, the Associate Dean in the College of
Medicine, informed Wagner by memorandum that a course coordinator
had expressed concern for the faculty and enrolled students stemming
from Wagner's continued interaction with them. In addition, Smith
stated that other faculty members received threatening statements from
Wagner regarding the use of firearms. Smith directed Wagner not to at-
tend course lectures or laboratory classes. Although the memorandum
was marked confidential, copies were sent to the Course Coordinator, the
Associate Provost and Dean of Faculties (who was assigned by the Presi-
dent of A&M to work with the College of Medicine and Wagner to re-
solve Wagner's difficulties), the Special Assistant to the Executive Vice
President and Provost (who assisted in addressing Wagner's concerns),
and to the Department Head.
Relying on the doctrine of qualified privilege, the court awarded sum-
mary judgment on Wagner's defamation claim.199 In addressing the issue
of qualified privilege, the court concluded that each of the individuals to
whom the memorandum was forwarded had an interest or duty in the
matters that the letter addressed. 200 The court further concluded that
Smith did not act in bad faith when he wrote the memorandum, inasmuch
as Wagner presented no evidence that Smith entertained any serious
doubts as the truth of any of the information contained in the
memorandum. 201
In Baldwin v. The University of Texas Medical Branch,20 2 Dr. Susan
Baldwin sued The University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston
(UTMB) for defamation. Dr. Baldwin was a medical resident at UTMB.
After Dr. Baldwin's third year of residency, various physicians with
whom she worked gave her poor performance evaluations. Based upon
these evaluations, UTMB decided that Dr. Baldwin's contract should not
be renewed for a fourth year of residency. Dr. Baldwin claimed that the
performance reviews were defamatory and that publication of the evalua-
tions to faculty discredited her and caused others to question her abilities.
The court disagreed, holding that the evaluations were permissible state-
ments of opinion of the physicians and were not defamatory as a matter
of law. 20 3 In addition, the court concluded that the evaluations com-
pleted by the physicians were protected by a qualified privilege. 20 4 The
court explained that accusations or comments about an employee by her
employer, made to a person having an interest or duty in the matter to
which the communication relates, have a qualified privilege.20 5 The court
199. Id. at 1332. Notably, the court also found summary judgment appropriate as to the
defamation claim based on the principals of sovereign and official immunity. Id.
200. Id. at 1331.
201. Id. at 1332.
202. 945 F. Supp. 1022 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
203. Id. at 1035.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1036.
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concluded that the evaluations were prepared by the physicians as part of
their supervisory duties and were directed to the director of the residency
program, who had a duty and an interest with regard to Dr. Baldwin's
performance in the residency program.20 6 Because the physicians' affida-
vits established that there was no actual malice, the court held that the
qualified privilege was not lost.20 7 Accordingly, the court granted
UTMB's motion for summary judgment on Dr. Baldwin's defamation
claim.208
7. Obligation of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Although individuals continue to urge the courts to adopt an implied
contractual covenant or a tortious duty of good faith and fair dealing in
the employer-employee relationship, the Texas Supreme Court 209 and the




209. See SmithKline, 903 S.W.2d at 356; Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d at 284 n.1 (noting that
the supreme court has declined to recognize a general duty of good faith and fair dealing in
the employer-employee relationship); McClendon, 807 S.W.2d at 577; Winters, 795 S.W.2d
at 724 n.2; see also Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 462 (Texas courts do not recognize covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in the employment relationship); Caton v. Leach Corp., 896 F.2d 939,
948-49 (5th Cir. 1990) (Texas courts do not recognize duty of good faith and fair dealing in
employment relationship); Rayburn, 805 F. Supp. at 1409 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (Texas courts do
not recognize either contractual implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing or tort
duty of good faith and fair dealing in employment relationship); Guzman, 756 F. Supp. at
1000-01 (Texas courts do not recognize duty of good faith and fair dealing in employment
relationship); Rodriguez, 716 F. Supp. at 276-77 (no duty of good faith and fair dealing in
employment relationship); Bowser, 714 F. Supp. at 842 (Texas courts do not recognize duty
of good faith and fair dealing in employment relationship).
210. See Wilson, 940 F.Supp. 1003; Rios, 930 S.W.2d 809; Macky v. U.P. Enters., Inc.,
935 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1996, n.w.h.); Employers Ins. Co. of Wausau, 1995 WL
19225 at *5; Mott, 882 S.W.2d at 639; Cole v. Hall, 864 S.W.2d 563, 568 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1993, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (en banc) (rejecting claim for duty of good faith and fair dealing in
the employment relationship); Amador, 855 S.W.2d at 134 (recognizing that supreme court
expressly rejected an invitation to recognize the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in the employment area); Day & Zimmerman, 831 S.W.2d at 71 (no cause of action
for breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing in employment context); Casas, 818
S.W.2d at 468-69 (rejecting claim for breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, court
recognized that current mood of a majority supreme court is to adhere to at-will rule);
Winograd, 789 S.W.2d at 312 (neither the legislature nor the supreme court have recog-
nized an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment relationship);
Hicks, 789 S.W.2d at 303-04 (in denying writ supreme court expressly rejected an invitation
to recognize an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment rela-
tionship); Lumpkin, 755 S.W.2d at 540 (court rejected implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in the employment relationship).
In Lumpkin the sole point of error on appeal to the court of appeals was whether an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is inherent in the employer-employee rela-
tionship. Lumpkin, 755 S.W.2d at 539. The court of appeals overruled Lumpkin's point of
error, and Lumpkin appealed the issue to the supreme court. Lumpkin v. H & C Commu-
nications, Inc., 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 13 (Oct. 16, 1988). Lumpkin's application for a writ of
error had been pending before the supreme court for approximately one year when the
court decided McClendon, infra note 4. Curiously, the supreme court did not grant
Lumpkin's application when it granted McClendon's application to consolidate the cases.
Nevertheless, shortly after McClendon, the court denied Lumpkin's application for a writ
of error. 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 114 (Dec. 6, 1989).
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pears that the Texas Supreme Court laid the issue to rest in McClendon v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co.211 On remand from the United States Supreme
Court,212 the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' deci-
sion that there is not an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
the employment relationship. 213 The McClendon court of appeals specifi-
cally declined to extend the Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Insur-
ance Co. 214 duty of good faith and fair dealing to the employment
relationship. 21 5 It held that the special relationship between insurers and
insureds is not equally applicable to employers and employees, and that
to extend it to the employment relationship would be tantamount to im-
posing such a duty on all commercial relationships.216 Imposing the duty
on the employment relationship would also violate the supreme court's
disapproval of restrictions on free movement of employees in the work-
place. 217 Finally, the volumes of legislation restricting an employer's right
to discharge an employee compels the conclusion that such a dramatic
change in policy affecting the employer-employee relationship and the
employment at-will doctrine should be left to the legislature. 218
& Fraud and Misrepresentation
In addition to traditional breach of contract claims, employees will
often attempt to circumvent the restrictions of contract damages by ex-
panding claims to include fraud and misrepresentation. 21 9
211. 757 S.W.2d 816, 819-20 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988), rev'd on other
grounds, 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989), rev'd, 498 U.S. 133 (1990), affd on remand, 807 S.W.2d
577 (Tex. 1991).
212. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
213. McClendon, 807 S.W.2d at 577.
214. 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987) (duty of good faith and fair dealing extended to insur-
ers and insureds).
215. McClendon, 757 S.W.2d at 819-20.
216. Id. at 819.
217. Id. at 820 (citing Bergman v. Norris of Houston, 734 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1987); Hill v.
Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1987)).
218. McClendon, 757 S.W.2d at 820 (citing TEx. CONST. art. Il, § 1; Molder, 665 S.W.2d
at 177; Watson v. Zep Mfg. Co., 582 S.W.2d 178, 180 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)).
219. As employers examine the alternatives of dropping state sponsored workers com-
pensation coverage programs and implementing "substitute" programs, caution is strongly
advised to properly characterize the scope of benefits under the particular program to
avoid claims of fraud and misrepresentation. In Beneficial Personnel Services of Texas,
Inc. v. Porras, 927 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996), vacated as moot, 938 S.W.2d 716
(1997), Noel Porras was an oil field worker employed originally by White Well Service
(White Well). White Well entered into an agreement with Beneficial Personnel Services of
Texas, Inc. (BPS) whereby White Well fired all of its employees, and BPS immediately
rehired and leased them back to White Well. BPS agreed to provide employees benefits
for injuries compensable under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act (Act), but not
through the traditional state sanctioned system. Porras and BPS signed an agreement
whereby Porras agreed his remedies for injuries would be limited to those allowed by the
Act. Porras was thereafter injured on the job, and required surgery and physical therapy.
While some wages and benefits were paid to Porras and his doctors, the amounts were less
than those otherwise available under the Act. Relying on the representations made by
BPS to employees regarding the alternative benefits coverage BPS presented, Porras sued
BPS for fraud.
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In Johnson & Johnson Medical, Inc. v. Sanchez,220 Martha Sanchez
sued her former employer, Johnson & Johnson Medical (Johnson), for
fraud. Sanchez worked as a material handler. She went on a medical
leave of absence after suffering an on-the-job injury. After 120 days of
medical leave, Johnson placed Sanchez on "indefinite medical layoff" and
informed her that she had recall rights. On several occasions, Johnson
told Sanchez that while there was no job currently available, she would be
called back for the next available job. Johnson never called Sanchez back
to work and Sanchez sued. The Texas Supreme Court found no evidence
of fraud to support Sanchez's claim.221 The court held that to recover for
fraud, Sanchez had to prove "a material misrepresentation, which was
false, and was ... known to be false when made or [made] without knowl-
edge of the truth, which was intended to be acted upon, which was relied
upon, and which caused injury. ' 222 The court focused on the reliance
element of Sanchez's fraud claim finding that Sanchez presented no evi-
dence that she relied to her detriment on any representation made by
Johnson, such as refusing other offers of employment.223 To the contrary,
Sanchez accepted other employment during the period in question.224
In Williams v. City of Midland,225 Don Williams and Ray Miller sued
the City of Midland (Midland) for negligent misrepresentation. A police
recruiting brochure distributed by Midland indicated that recruits would
make $2,578 per month upon graduation from the academy and becom-
ing a licensed officer. Although Williams and Miller had interviews with
Midland police officers, the only information that they were given on sal-
ary was the information contained in the brochure. About halfway
BPS argued that the case sounded only in contacts. However, the court held that
whether BPS fraudulently induced Porras into the contract created a tort action. Id. at 186.
The court held that Porras had established a material misrepresentation in that BPS had
led people to believe, through oral and written representations, that BPS would provide
the same benefits the employees would have received under the Act. Id. at 187. More-
over, BPS' misrepresentation was false when made because the documents BPS provided
indicated that their policies were not in keeping with procedures and benefits required by
the Act. Id. at 188. The court found that BPS either knew it would not provide benefits
equal to those under the Act or made that promise without any idea as to what it entailed.
Porras' testimony that he relied on the representations of BPS, coupled with BPS' testi-
mony that they intended employees to so rely, established the reliance element of fraud.
Finally, as Porras proved injury by showing damage to his credit reputation through BPS'
refusal to pay medical bills, as well as a host of other pecuniary and emotional losses. Id. at
190. Moreover, the court found the evidence sufficient to support both actual damages for
fraud as well as an award of punitive damages. Id. at 190-91. The Texas Supreme Court
granted the writ of error, but the court of appeals decision was subsequently vacated and
remanded to the appellate court in accordance with the parties settlement agreement. 938
S.W.2d 716. For a companion case discussing similar issues, see Beneficial Personnel Serv-
ices of Texas, Inc. v. Rey, 927 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996), vacated as moot, 938
S.W.2d 717 (1997).
220. 924 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1996). For an additional discussion of Johnson & Johnson
Medical, see text accompanying infra notes 361-64.
221. Id. at 929.
222. Id. at 929-30.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. 932 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, no writ).
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through their stint at the academy, Williams and Miller learned that the
salary information in the brochure was incorrect. However, both men
waited until after their graduation and promotion to police officer to
bring suit for the salary stated in the brochure. While there was evidence
on which a jury could base a finding of negligent misrepresentation, the
court held that Midland had made out a defense of waiver.22 6 Waiver, or
ratification in this context, occurs "when a person, induced by a fraud to
enter into an agreement, continues to accept benefits under that agree-
ment after becoming fully aware of the fraud.122 7 Williams and Miller
learned of the misrepresentation midway through their academy stay and
yet continued their paid training and were hired as Midland police of-
ficers. They were not compelled to continue and could have refused fur-
ther training and instituted suit. Because they had accepted the benefits
of the agreement with full knowledge of the misrepresentation, the court
held that the two could not now avoid the effects of the agreement. 228
Thus, the officers improperly sought the difference between their actual
salary and the misrepresented salary. Under a negligent misrepresenta-
tion claim, a plaintiff may only recover for direct pecuniary loss and not
for benefit of the bargain, lost profits, or mental anguish.229 Moreover,
since the facts in the case were not disputed, the issue was one to be
decided as a matter of law and would properly support the trial court's
award of judgment notwithstanding the verdict.230
In Innovo Group, Inc. v. Tedesco,231 Michael Tedesco sued his former
employer, Innovo Group, Inc. (Innovo), for negligent misrepresentation
as well as breach of contract.2 32 Tedesco moved from New York to Texas
and began working as a salesperson for Innovo. Prior to employment,
Tedesco created a logo for use on certain Innovo products and Tedesco
was to receive a commission on all products sold with that logo. Innovo
became dissatisfied with Tedesco's performance and terminated his em-
ployment. Tedesco sued, claiming that Innovo made several negligent
misrepresentations during the employment contract negotiations that in-
duced him to move to Houston. A jury found in favor of Tedesco on his
negligent misrepresentation claim and awarded damages. On appeal the
court of appeals reversed because the damages claimed under the negli-
gent misrepresentation claim were the same as the damages under Ted-
esco's breach of contract claim, and Tedesco could not recover for
both.2 33 Tedesco did not prove any damages separate and apart from his
226. Id. at 685.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.; Camp, 30 F.3d at 38 (financial injury not measured by what plaintiff might
have gained but by what actually lost).
230. Williams, 932 S.W.2d at 686.
231. No. 01-94-01230-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 10, 1996, writ denied)
(not designated for publication), 1996 WL 580465.
232. For a discussion of breach of contract claims see supra notes 22-106.
233. Innovo Group, 1996 WL 580465 at *8.
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contract damages.234
In Wilson,235 Mia Wilson's suit complained of various incidents involv-
ing her immediate supervisor at Sysco, Carroll Bonneau, including failure
to disclose material facts. After termination for poor performance, Wil-
son sued for fraudulent misrepresentation contending she had been told
by Sysco that she would be judged on the basis of merit and be given
equal consideration for all positions at Sysco. Based upon Wilson's testi-
mony that she was never told that Sysco could not terminate her at-will,
was never promised or guaranteed employment for any fixed time, and
understood that her employment was of indefinite duration, the court
held that Wilson had produced no evidence that Sysco made any material
misrepresentations concerning the terms and conditions of her employ-
ment with Sysco. 2 36 Wilson also alleged that Sysco failed to reveal mate-
rial facts that it had a duty to disclose to the effect that Wilson was not
provided the opportunity to be evaluated on a non-discriminatory basis
for transfer, promotion and continued employment. 237 "In the absence of
an agreement to disclose, a duty to disclose arises only where there is
some special relationship between the parties. '238 The court held that
there was no evidence of a special relationship between Wilson and
Sysco, 239 entitling Sysco to summary judgment. 24°
9. Tortious Interference
In Calvillo v. Gonzalez,241 Calvillo and Gonzalez were anesthesiolo-
gists with staff privileges at San Jacinto Methodist Hospital (the Hospi-
tal). The Hospital contracted with Calvillo to serve as chief of
anesthesiology for the Hospital, giving him exclusive authority to operate
and staff the anesthesia department. After Calvillo refused to schedule
Gonzalez for anesthesiology work, Gonzalez sued Calvillo for, among
other things, tortious interference with contract. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of Calvillo on Gonzalez's claim for tortious
interference with contract, but the court of appeals reversed, implicitly
holding that Calvillo might not be justified as a matter of law in interfer-
ing with Gonzalez's business relations because of Calvillo's "personal ac-
rimony" toward Gonzalez. 242
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision and
affirmed that of the trial court, granting Calvillo's summary judgment on
Gonzalez's tortious interference with contract claim. The supreme court
explained that in a tortious interference case a defendant's motivation
234. Id.
235. 940 F. Supp. 1003. For a discussion of facts and related claims asserted, see text
accompanying supra notes 24-28, 130-32.




240. Id. at 1015.
241. 922 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 1996).
242. Id at 929.
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behind the assertion of a legal right is irrelevant since the right conclu-
sively establishes the justification defense.243 This is true whether the
claim is for tortious interference with an existing contract or for tortious
interference with prospective business relations.244 The court concluded
that "Calvillo's exclusive contract with the hospital justifies, as a matter of
law, his interference with [Gonzalez's] prospective business relations,"
and that "[g]ood faith is not a relevant factor in determining justification
if the defendant acts to assert a legal right. '245
In Wardlaw v. Inland Container Corp.,246 Dudley Wardlaw was em-
ployed as a national account service executive for Inland Container Corp.
(Inland). Anheuser-Busch (Anheuser) was one of Inland's customers. In
an effort to act as a consultant for Stone Container Corp. (Stone), War-
dlaw wrote a letter to Stone disclosing confidential information about
Anheuser's relationship with Inland and encouraged Stone to call
Anheuser to confirm that Wardlaw's efforts fostered Inland's growth. An
employee of Stone contacted Anheuser and provided Anheuser with a
copy of Wardlaw's letter. Concerned that Wardlaw disclosed confidential
information, Anheuser contacted Inland. Anheuser did not request that
any action be taken against Wardlaw or that the letter be reported to
Wardlaw's supervisors. Concerned that his supervisor would find out
about the letter, Wardlaw disclosed it to his supervisor. Wardlaw was
thereafter terminated for violating Inland's anti-trust compliance policy
and for offering to use customer contacts he acquired at Inland to influ-
ence major customers to conduct business with Stone. Among other
claims, Wardlaw filed suit alleging that Anheuser tortiously interfered
with Wardlaw's employment contract. The jury found in favor of War-
dlaw, and Anheuser appealed.247
On appeal, Anheuser argued that it did not intentionally interfere with
Wardlaw's employment contract. To prevail, Wardlaw had to prove that
Anheuser intended to interfere with Wardlaw's employment or was sub-
stantially certain that such interference would result from Anheuser's
phone call to Inland.248 The court concluded that reasonable jurors could
conclude that Anheuser's interference was, in fact, intentional.249 Noting
that Anheuser never contacted Wardlaw to prevent future dissemination
of the letter and never requested that Inland or Stone destroy their copies
of the letter,250 the court held that a reasonable jury could find that
Anheuser's actions proximately caused Wardlaw's termination.251 The
court explained that while Anheuser did not give a copy of the letter to




246. 76 F.3d 1372 (5th Cir. 1996).
247. Id. at 1374-75.
248. Id. at 1376.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1376-78.
251. Id. at 1378.
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foreseeable factor in bringing about Wardlaw's termination.252 The court
noted that Anheuser's knowledge that some action would be taken in
response to the phone call, Anheuser's admission that informing an em-
ployer that an employee engaged in wrongdoing could have detrimental
effects on the employee, Anheuser's failure to request that all copies of
the letter be destroyed, Anheuser's statement that it hoped that
Anheuser's involvement with the letter did not cause Wardlaw's termina-
tion, and Anheuser's testimony that it knew that Wardlaw would not have
been fired if Anheuser had not called Inland, all provided some evidence
from which a jury could concluded that the elements of intent and proxi-
mate cause were satisfied.253
Still, the trial court jury decision was reversed. Despite the findings
supporting interference, the court concluded that Anheuser established
legal justification for its actions. Thus, Wardlaw was precluded from re-
covering from his claim for tortious interference. 254 The court explained
that Anheuser was privileged to interfere in the contract if the interfer-
ence was done "in a bona fide exercise of Anheuser's own rights or if
Anheuser [had] an equal or superior right in the subject matter to that of
[Wardlaw]."'255 The court added that good faith was irrelevant if the evi-
dence established a legal right to interfere, but good faith continued to be
an essential element where the defendant asserted only a colorable legal
claim.256 Anheuser's purchase order agreement with Inland provided
that, without Anheuser's prior written consent, Inland would not adver-
tise or publish that it furnished goods to Anheuser. Wardlaw admitted
that he did not seek Anheuser's permission before disseminating the in-
formation to Stone.257 The court concluded that "[t]he purchase order
agreement gave Anheuser a legal right to complain about the release be-
cause Wardlaw's dissemination violated the agreement's express
terms. '258 Because Anheuser had a legal right to complain of Wardlaw's
disclosure, Anheuser was not required to prove that it acted in good
faith.259 However, even if the purchase order agreement did not create a
legal right in favor of Anheuser, the court stated that Anheuser proved
the existence of a good faith assertion of a colorable legal right, inasmuch
as "Anheuser established that it considered the information confidential,
and acted on its right to protect that confidentiality. ' 260 Accordingly, the
court reversed the judgment of the district court awarding Wardlaw dam-
ages for tortious interference and dismissed Wardlaw's claim with
252. Id. at 1377.
253. Id. at 1378.
254. Id. at 1380.
255. Id. at 1378.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1378-79.






In Whitesides v. Kohler Co. ,262 Tom Whitesides appealed from a sum-
mary judgment granted to Kohler and its subsidiary Sterling Plumbing
Group, Inc. (Sterling), on his claim of tortious interference with a busi-
ness relationship. Whitesides was employed by Perkins Sales Company,
Inc. (Perkins) and was involved in the marketing of a low consumption
toilet (Mansfield toilet). Whitesides and another salesman made demon-
strations involving the Mansfield toilet and a low consumption model
manufactured by Sterling. Whitesides claimed the Sterling toilet flushed
as much as 2.3 gallons while the Mansfield toilet met the Texas Water
Commission's standard of 1.6 gallons. Sterling learned of the demonstra-
tions and one of Kohler's in-house counsel wrote a letter to Perkins de-
manding an end to false claims being made about the Sterling toilet,
although the letter did not mention anyone by name.263 Soon after re-
ceiving the letter, Perkins terminated Whitesides' employment for,
among other things, "recent reports of misconduct and unethical business
practices. "264
In writing the letter to Perkins, Kohler's counsel did not mention
Whitesides by name nor ask that any employee be fired, requesting only
that the false representations be stopped and that letters of retraction be
sent to anyone to whom the representations were made. Counsel did not
know of the identities of the persons demonstrating the toilet until the
time of the lawsuit. The intent in writing the letter was merely to protect
Sterling's business interests by stopping the false representations. Ster-
ling's counsel did not think that anyone would be fired nor did she be-
lieve that a termination was substantially certain to result. The court held
that intentional interference was a necessary element of a tortious inter-
ference claim and that Whitesides' summary judgment evidence did not
raise a fact issue that Sterling and Kohler intended to interfere with
Whitesides' employment with Perkins.265
In Bennett v. Computer Associates International, Inc. ,266 J. William
Bennett sued Computer Associates International, Inc. and others (CAI)
for tortious interference with an employment contract. The allegations
arose from the sale of assets of the J. William Bennett Company to Goal
Systems International, Inc. (Goal). The assets sold consisted of, among
other things, various software products allegedly developed by Bennett.
In addition, Goal executed a written employment agreement with Ben-
nett. After the close of the transaction, CAI sued Goal for copyright in-
261. Id. at 1381; Lee, 897 S.W.2d at 505 (employees of companies with ongoing business
relationships are properly subject to discharge upon complaints by customer companies
where complaints constitute bona fide exercise of rights).
262. No. 01-94-01294-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] July 25, 1996, n.w.h.) (not
designated for publication), 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 3208.
263. Id. at *1-3.
264. Id. at *3.
265. Id. at *10.
266. 932 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, no writ).
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fringement, alleging that two of the five software products purchased by
Goal from the J. William Bennett Company contained proprietary infor-
mation created or owned by CAI. The lawsuit between CAI and Goal
settled, Goal fired Bennett, and refused to perform its remaining obliga-
tions under the asset purchase agreement.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's granting of summary judg-
ment in favor of CAI on Bennett's claim that CAI tortiously interfered
with his employment contract.267 The court explained that the uncontra-
dicted affidavit of Goal's president attested that Goal's decision to termi-
nate Bennett was not instigated by CAI and was not discussed with
CAI.268 Because CAI negated all material questions of fact regarding the
proximate cause of Bennett's discharge and established that Goal acted
unilaterally upon information garnered through its own investigation,
summary judgment on Bennett's tortious interference with employment
contract claim was warranted. 269
In Bonenberger,270 Donna Bonenberger complained that the trial court
improperly granted summary judgment on her claim that her boss Augus-
tine Dueno tortiously interfered with her employment relationship.
Bonenberger was fired for what her employer viewed as misconduct
while reviewing patient records at a hospital in Texarkana. While an at-
will employment agreement can be the subject of a tortious interference
claim, "[a]s a general rule, an agent cannot be personally liable for tor-
tious interference with its principal's contracts. 12 71 An agent can, how-
ever, be liable for tortious interference if he acts outside the scope of his
agency, pursuing purely personal objectives. 272 The court found that
Dueno was Continental's agent and was acting in the scope of his agency
in that Dueno was authorized to discipline and reward personnel under
his supervision and he took all of his directions and instructions for con-
ducting business from Continental.273 Bonenberger could put forth no
facts establishing that Dueno acted outside the scope of his agency.274
Bonenberger's attempts to show personal discord between herself and
Dueno were also unsuccessful. The court felt that any animosity shown
towards Bonenberger "is not relevant, by itself, to show Dueno acted
outside the scope of his agency ... and is not evidence tending to prove
that Dueno committed an act that was so contrary to CRR's best interest
that it could only have been motivated by the pursuit of his personal in-
267. Id. at 205.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. 1996 WL 429299; see also supra notes 123-126, infra notes 308-10 and accompany-
ing text.
271. Id. at *5; Rios, 930 S.W.2d at 816-17 (supervisor had legal right and duty to report
plaintiff's violation of company policy which led to plaintiff's termination of employment);
see also Massey, 902 S.W.2d at 85 (agent of employer, acting within course and scope of
employment, cannot, as matter of law, interfere with co-employee's employment); Bhali,
896 S.W.2d at 210-11.
272. Bonenbeger, 1996 WL 429299 at *5.




terests. ' 275 Accordingly, the court affirmed summary judgment in favor
of Continental. 276
10. Negligent Hiring, Retention and Supervision of Employees
In Duran v. Furr's Supermarkets, Inc.,277 Graciela Duran sued Furr's
Supermarkets, Inc. (Furr's) for injuries allegedly caused by Steve Ro-
mero, an off-duty police officer working as a security guard for Furr's,
claiming that Furr's negligently hired Romero. Duran alleged that Ro-
mero was verbally and physically abusive to her and was the proximate
cause of her injuries. 278 The appellate court found that a fact issue ex-
isted and reversed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of
Furr's. 279 The court noted that the basis of responsibility under negligent
hiring is the employer's own negligence in hiring an incompetent servant
whom the master knows or by the existence of reasonable care should
have known was incompetent and "thereby creating an unreasonable risk
of harm to others. '280 The court stated that there must be evidence that
the plaintiff's injuries were brought about by reason of the employment
of the incompetent servant and be, in some manner, job-related. 281 In
other words, negligence in hiring the servant must be the proximate cause
of the injuries-which entails cause in fact and foreseeability.2 82 The
summary evidence showed that Furr's made no inquiry into Romero's
background as a police officer.283 "If Furr's had conducted an investiga-
tion .... it would have learned that Romero had a prior complaint for
using vulgar and abusive language towards a member of the public while
on duty as a police officer. ' '284 The court held that a fact issue was raised
as to whether knowledge of such incident would put a reasonable person
on notice that Romero might verbally abuse a store patron and therefore
summary judgment was improper.285
In Mackey v. U.P. Enterprises, Inc.,286 Glenda Mackey sued her em-
ployer, U.P. Enterprises, Inc. (UPE) for, among other things, negligent
supervision, training and evaluation.287 The trial court granted summary
judgment against Mackey on all of her causes of action, and Mackey ap-
pealed. Mackey alleged that UPE failed to adequately monitor her su-
pervisors' practices, failed to detect and take action to deter the alleged
sexual harassment by her supervisors, and failed to implement and moni-
275. Id. (citation omitted).
276. Id.
277. 921 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. App.-E! Paso 1996, no writ).
278. Id. at 783.
279. Id. at 790.
280. Id. at 789.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 790.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. 935 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. App.-1yler 1996, no writ).
287. For facts of case, see discussion infra notes 444-51.
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tor procedures for the handling of employee grievances. 288 The court of
appeals held that the trial court did not err in granting summary judg-
ment on the negligence cause of action.289 The court reasoned that
UPE's uncontroverted summary judgment evidence showed that UPE
had a written policy against sexual harassment that was posted in all
stores and that UPE required all new employees to read the policy and to
sign a statement acknowledging that they had read and understood the
statement.290 "UPE conducted training sessions with its managers and
employees at least twice per month and at these meetings stressed that
sexual harassment was strictly against company policy. '29 1 "UPE estab-
lished and implemented a grievance procedure that was posted at each of
the restaurants," and "an officer of the company visited each restaurant
daily... to monitor the activities of the employees. '292 Because Mackey
failed to submit any summary judgment evidence controverting these
facts or to specify other acts or omissions of UPE showing that it failed to
monitor supervisory practices, failed to detect or take action to deter the
alleged sexual harassment, or failed to implement and monitor proce-
dures for handling grievances, there was "no genuine issue of [material]
fact regarding Mackey's alleged negligent supervision, training, and eval-
uation" claim.293
In Chandler v. Control Specialties, Inc.,294 Tonya Chandler sued Con-
trol Specialties, Inc. (CSI) and her supervisor Erwin Dodson based upon
Dodson's rude and suggestive comments, inappropriate touching, watch-
ing her ascend the stairs, and spying on her through a hole in the wall of
the ladies' room. Chandler alleged that sexual harassment cases involv-
ing claims of negligence could be pursued independently of the Texas
Workers Compensation Act.295 The court held that since Chandler's
claims were merely common law claims, the Texas Workers Compensa-
tion Act would exempt CSI "from all common law liability based on neg-
ligence and gross negligence, except in [the inapplicable area of] death
cases for exemplary damages. '296 Therefore, the trial court properly re-
fused to submit jury issues on CSI's negligence and gross negligence.297
In Yeager v. Drillers, Inc.,298 Union Pacific Resources Company
(UPRC), a leaseholder of a well site, contracted with Drillers, Inc. (Drill-
ers) to drill a well on the lease. UPRC also contracted with another com-
pany, Superior Tubular Services (Superior), to install casing into the well.
288. Mackey, 935 S.W.2d at 446.
289. Id. at 460.




294. No. 14-94-00444-CV 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 1142 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] March 21, 1996, writ denied) (not released for publication).
295. Id. at *1-2.
296. Id. at *17.
297. Id.
298. 930 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ).
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William Yeager, an employee of Superior, was injured when he fell from
the well after a rope that he was using broke. Among other claims, Ye-
ager sued UPRC for negligence in hiring Drillers to drill the well. The
trial court granted UPRC's motion for summary judgment on Yeager's
negligent hiring claim, and Yeager appealed. 299
The appeals court explained that "[t]he basis of responsibility under
the doctrine of negligent hiring is the master's own negligence in hiring
an incompetent employee whom the master knows or by the exercise of
reasonable care should have known was incompetent, thereby creating an
unreasonable risk of harm to others. ' 300 The court concluded, however,
that UPRC's evidence showed that Drillers performed work for UPRC in
the past and that Drillers proved that it had the necessary experience and
expertise to perform work in a competent manner.301 Further, Yeager
testified that he had been on the rig on which Drillers worked a few times
before, that it was one of the better rigs, and that Drillers' workers were
good and safe. 302 Because Yeager brought forth no evidence contra-
dicting that Drillers was competent, the appeals court concluded that
summary judgment was proper on Yeager's negligent hiring claim.303
In Rios,30 4 David Rios sued his former employer TCB, for negligent
investigation, claiming that TCB failed to properly investigate the circum-
stances that led to his termination. The trial court granted summary judg-
ment on Rios's negligent investigation claim, and Rios appealed. 305 The
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, reasoning that be-
cause there was no limitation on TCB's ability to terminate Rios without
cause, TCB had no duty to investigate before discharging Rios.30 6 Fur-
ther, Rios admitted to committing the insubordinate conduct for which he
was terminated, foreclosing any need for conducting additional investiga-
tion prior to reaching the conclusion that termination was appropriate. 30 7
In Bonenberger,308 Donna Bonenberger claimed that the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment on her claim that CRR negligently
breached its duty to provide knowledgeable and competent managers.
Bonenberger alleged that her boss was not a knowledgeable and compe-
tent manager and that CRR had thus breached a duty to provide her with
knowledgeable and competent managers and had proximately caused her
injury.309 The court declined to recognize "an employer's duty to provide
knowledgeable and competent managers as a viable common law cause
299. Id. at 114.




304. 930 S.W.2d at 809; see supra notes 42-47, 157-59, infra notes 452-58, and accompa-
nying text.
305. Id. at 812-13.
306. Id. at 816.
307. Id.
308. 1996 WL 429299; see supra notes 123-26, 270-76 and accompanying text.
309. Id. at *1.
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of action in Texas" and affirmed the trial court's award of summary
judgment.310
B. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
Commentators have urged employees to pursue claims for violations of
their state constitutional rights when they sue their employers. These
claims have been unsuccessful. 311
In City of Sherman v. Henry,312 Otis Henry was a police officer with the
City of Sherman (City) who was denied a promotion to the rank of ser-
geant because he was having an affair with the wife of a fellow police
officer, who was herself a City police officer. Henry ranked first on the
City's list of eligible candidates for promotion to the sergeant position.
However, Chief of Police Stephen Pilant told Henry in a written memo-
randum explaining the denial of the promotion that he believed Henry
would not command the respect and trust of other officers, and that
Henry's promotion would adversely affect department efficiency and mo-
rale. Pilant orally explained that the affair was the reason for the denial
of the promotion. Henry asserted that his conduct was protected by the
right to privacy under the Texas Constitution.
The Texas Supreme Court discussed two types of privacy interests: (a)
an "interest in avoiding the disclosure of personal information," and
(b) "the right to make certain kinds of important decisions and to engage
in certain kinds of conduct.1313 The court cited Texas State Employees
Union v. Texas Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation314
(hereinafter TSEU) for the idea that a "right of individual privacy is im-
plicit among those 'general, great, and essential principles of liberty and
310. Id. at *7.
311. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d at 147 (no implied private right of action for damages arising
under the free speech and free assembly sections of the Texas Constitution; suits for equi-
table remedies for violation of constitutional rights are not prohibited, while suits for
money damages are barred); Albertson's, Inc. v. Ortiz, 856 S.W.2d 836, 840 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1993, writ denied) (Because Albertson's was a completely private entity, the court
"decline[d] to recognize a compensatory cause of action to redress a wholly private entity's
infringement of free-speech rights guaranteed by the state constitution"). The Austin
Court of Appeals also observed that it had refused to recognize a constitutional action for
violations of Article I, section 8 of the Texas Constitution in the absence of state action. Id.
at 840 n.7 (citing Weaver v. AIDS Servs., Inc., 835 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Tex. App.-Austin
1992, writ denied)); Scott, 876 F. Supp. at 857-58 (probationary employees of the City of
Dallas Police Department possess no property interest in continued employment); Harris
County v. Going, 896 S.W.2d 305, 308 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied)
(holding that "there is no implied right of action for damages arising under the free speech
provision of the Texas Constitution"); Jones, 896 S.W.2d at 577 (court held that "[tlhere is
no self-operative creation of a constitutional tort liability"); Cote, 894 S.W.2d at 542 (plain-
tiff could not recover for alleged free speech violations relating to her termination of em-
ployment with Travis County because plaintiff was afforded all her due process rights and
there is no implied private right of action for damages under the Texas Constitution when
an individual alleges violations of speech and assembly rights under article I, sections 8 and
27 of the Texas Constitution).
312. 928 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. 1996).
313. Id at 467.
314. 746 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex. 1987).
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free government' established by the Texas Bill of Rights. '315 Henry
urged that the basis of the City's decision violated his constitutionally
protected privacy rights "to make certain fundamental decisions and en-
gage in certain conduct without state interference. '316 More specifically,
the court framed the issue as whether Henry's affair was a fundamental
constitutionally protected right.317 The court stated that although the
Texas Constitution did not explicitly provide a right to privacy, several
sections of Article I provide zones of privacy. Of these sections, the only
one applicable to Henry's claim was section 19 concerning deprivation of
life, liberty, and property and due course of law.318 The court, however,
held that "there is no reason to believe that Article I, section 19 of the
Texas Constitution provides a right of privacy for Henry's conduct. '319
Rejecting the expansive constitutional interpretation proposed, the court
noted that Henry implicitly conceded that the original intent of the Texas
Constitution did not protect his conduct and went on to reject his argu-
ment that his conduct was constitutionally protected because it was no
longer illegal.320 Furthermore, the TSEU case did not establish that adul-
tery was a protected right because that case dealt not with individual con-
duct but with the constitutionality of government intrusion. 32' Therefore,
the court held that the Texas Constitution did not provide a right of pri-
vacy for a police officer denied a promotion because of an affair with the
wife of another officer. As a result, the City had a valid basis for denying
the promotion.322
In Favero v. Huntsville Independent School District,323 Franklin Favero,
Sr. and Franklin Favero, Jr. (the Faveros) worked as bus drivers for the
Huntsville Independent School District (the school district). The reli-
gious beliefs of the Faveros required them to abstain from work on vari-
ous religious days and to miss consecutive days of work to attend various
religious feasts. The Faveros requested ten day leaves of absence so that
they could observe a religious feast. The school district granted the re-
quest for the first five days of leave, but denied the request for leave for
the additional five days. Because the Faveros did not report to work dur-
ing the second week, they were terminated. As a result, the Faveros filed
315. Henry, 928 S.W.2d at 468.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 472.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 473.
321. Id. at 474.
322. Id. at 468, 474. In separate concurring opinions, both Justice Spector and Justice
Owen felt that the court had gone too far in its decision. Justice Spector felt that Henry's
privacy interests were infringed but that the City had a compelling interest in denying
Henry the promotion because Henry's conduct could justifiably been viewed as undermin-
ing his ability to lead. Id. at 476. Justice Owen wrote that even assuming Henry had a
cognizable constitutional right, the City had a compelling interest in denying his promotion
because his conduct had impaired his ability to command. Id. at 478.
323. 939 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
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suit alleging, among other things, violation of Article I, section 6 of the
Texas Constitution, which states as follows:
All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty
God according to the dictates of their own consciences. No man
shall be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship,
or to maintain any ministry against his consent. No human authority
ought, in any case whatever, to control or interfere with the rights of
conscience in matters of religion, and no preference shall ever be
given by law to any religious society or mode of worship. But it shall
be the duty of the Legislature to pass such laws as may be necessary
to protect equally every religious denomination in the peaceable en-
joyment of its own mode of public worship.324
The court granted the school district's motion for summary judgment
on the Faveros' Texas Constitution claim.325 The court reasoned that
"there is no implied private right of action for damages for a violation of
the Texas Constitution ... [and] that Texas does not recognize a common
law cause of action for damages for violations of constitutional rights."
326
Further, the court concluded that even if the Faveros could maintain a
cause of action under Article I, section 6 of the Texas Constitution, the
Faveros failed to state how the conduct of the school district violated that
section.327
In Woodland v. City of Houston,328 John Woodland represented a class
of people challenging the intrusive questions used in polygraph tests by
the City of Houston (Houston) when screening applicants for police and
fire officers. The named plaintiffs, who had "failed" the polygraph test,
were asked questions about sexual behavior with animals, homosexual or
extramarital affairs, masturbation, criminal behavior as a child (taking
money from mother's purse), sexual relations with spouses or girlfriends,
religious preference, criminal history of family and friends, membership
in "radical" organizations and a host of other intrusive and offensive
questions. The plaintiffs asserted that the questions violated their privacy
rights under the Texas Constitution.329 The court noted that the Texas
Constitution had surpassed the minimum guarantees provided by the
United States Constitution and that the implicit right to privacy guaran-
teed by the Texas Constitution "requires a governmental intrusion of pri-
vacy to serve a compelling objective that can be achieved by no less
intrusive, more reasonable means. '' 330 The court held that the questions
asked were not narrowly, specifically, and directly related to the appli-
cants' potential to adequately perform the job and intruded into private
affairs beyond matters reasonably related to job requirements. 331 Hous-
324. TEX. CONST. art I, § 6.
325. Favero, 939 F. Supp. at 1296.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. 918 F. Supp. 1047 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
329. Id. at 1048-50.
330. Id. at 1053.
331. Id. at 1054.
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ton attempted to justify the questions concerning domestic harmony by
asserting that domestic discord was the number one reason for cadets
leaving the academy. However, Houston put forth no evidence to sup-
port this claim and "its interest in a stable [police] force was not shown to
be remotely effected by questions about [an] applicant's married life. ' 332
Moreover, Houston had other reasonable means to get the information it
really needed, such as physical examinations, criminal records, diplomas,
employment history, and recommendations. 333 The court held that "[t]he
city's use of the explicit questions and the polygraph was an affront to the
Texas Constitution. '334 Accordingly, a permanent injunction prohibiting
the contested behavior was enforced against Houston.
C. STATUTORY CLAIMS
1. Retaliatory Discharge
The legislative purpose of sections 451.001-.003 to the Texas Labor
Code 335 is to "protect persons who are entitled to benefits under the
Worker's Compensation Law and to prevent them from being discharged
by reason of taking steps to collect such benefits. ' 336 A plaintiff bringing
a retaliatory discharge claim 337 has the burden of establishing a causal
link between the discharge from employment and the claim for workers'




335. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 451.001-.003 (Vernon 1996) (formerly TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon 1993) (repealed 1993)).
336. Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex. 1980); Gunn Chevrolet, Inc. v.Hinerman, 898 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. 1995). The court specifically refused to decide the issue of
whether employees of non-subscribers are protected by section 451.001. Id. at 819. The
court also refused to decide "whether notice of an employee's on-the-job injury to his non-
subscribing employer, [who is at fault] is sufficient to invoke any statutory protection
against retaliatory discharge." Id.
337. Williams v. Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist., 816 S.W.2d 838, 839 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1991, writ denied) (an employee bringing an 8307c cause of action against a govern-
mental unit is not required to comply with the notice provisions of the Texas Tort Claims
Act, TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.101(a) (Vernon 1986)).
338. Paragon Hotel Corp. v. Ramirez, 783 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, writ
denied). In Paragon, the court identified four factors in concluding that sufficient evidence
supported the finding of a causal link between the filing of the claim and the discharge:(1) those making the decision to discharge the plaintiff were aware of his compensation
claim; (2) those making the decision to discharge the plaintiff expressed a negative attitude
toward the plaintiff's injured condition; (3) the company failed to adhere to established
company policies with regard to progressive disciplinary action; and (4) the company dis-
criminated in its treatment of the plaintiff in comparison to other employees allegedly
guilty of similar infractions. Id. at 658. These four factors may be useful in analyzing
whether there is circumstantial evidence to support a causal link between the filing of a
workers' compensation claim and a subsequent discharge. In Continental Coffee Prods.
Co. v. Cazarez, 903 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995), affd in relevant
part, 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 172 (Dec. 13, 1996), the court relied on whether there was evidence
that the stated reason for the discharge was false as a fifth factor in the evaluation of
circumstantial evidence. Id. at 77-78. See Burfield v. Brown, Moore & Flint, Inc., 51 F.3d
583, 589-90 (5th Cir. 1995) (passage of fifteen to sixteen months between workers' compen-
sation claim and discharge militated against a finding of a causal link between the dis-
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solely because of his workers' compensation claim; he need only prove
that his claim was a determining or contributing factor in his discharge. 339
Thus, even if other reasons for discharge exist, the plaintiff may still re-
cover damages if retaliation is also a reason.340 Causation may be estab-
lished by direct or circumstantial evidence and by the reasonable
inferences drawn from such evidence. 341 Once the link is established,
"the employer must rebut the alleged discrimination by showing there
was a legitimate reason behind the discharge. '342
The Code provides that a successful plaintiff is entitled to reasonable
damages and is entitled to reinstatement to his or her former position. 343
The Texas Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase "reasonable dam-
ages" to embrace both actual and exemplary damages.3 "4 Actual dam-
ages can include lost past wages, lost future wages, lost past retirement,
lost future retirement, and other benefits which are ascertainable with
reasonable certainty. Employees seeking reinstatement on the ground
that they were wrongfully discharged must show that they are presently
able to perform the duties of the job that they had before the injury.345
Governmental immunity for political subdivisions for discharge is waived,
but only for the limited relief of reinstatement and backpay. 346
The federal courts continue to follow Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc.347
in finding that the retaliatory discharge provision is a civil action arising
charge and the filing of the workers' compensation claim; employer legally permitted to
terminate injured employee who, by the nature of injury, can no longer perform essential
functions of job); Unida v. Levi Strauss & Co., 986 F.2d 970, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1993) (court
held that the employees failed to show that they were discriminated against (or treated
differently) since the plant closure resulted in the discharge of all employees, regardless of
whether they had engaged in protested workers' compensation activities); Gifford Hill
Am., Inc. v. Whittington, 899 S.W.2d 760, 764 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, no writ) (failure
to request jury finding on uniform application of non-discriminatory policy waived the de-
fense since sufficient evidence of non-discriminatory application of discharge policy was
not established).
339. Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. Martin, 844 S.W.2d 229, 232 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 1992, writ denied); Ethicon, Inc. v. Martinez, 835 S.W.2d 826, 833 (Tex. App.-Aus-
tin 1992, writ denied); Worsham Steel Co. v. Arias, 831 S.W.2d 81, 84 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1992, no writ); Mid-South Bottling Co. v. Cigainero, 799 S.W.2d 385, 389 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 1990, writ denied); Azar Nut Co. v. Caille, 720 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1986), affd, 734 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1987).
340. Santex, Inc. v. Cunningham, 618 S.W.2d 557, 558-59 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981,
no writ).
341. Investment Properties Management, Inc. v. Montes, 821 S.W.2d 691, 694 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1991, no writ); Paragon, 783 S.W.2d at 658.
342. Hughes Tool Co. v. Richards, 624 S.W.2d 598, 599 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 991 (1982).
343. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 451.001-.003 (Vernon 1996).
344. Azar Nut, 734 S.W.2d at 669.
345. Schrader v. Artco Bell Corp., 579 S.W.2d 534, 540 (Tex. Civ. App.-T'yler 1979,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
346. City of LaPorte v. Barfield, 898 S.W.2d 288, 297 (Tex. 1995); Kuhl v. City of Gar-
land, 910 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex. 1995) (holding that the 1989 version of the Political Subdi-
visions Law waives governmental immunity for retaliatory discharge and authorizes
reinstatement and backpay as well as recovery for actual damages, subject to the restric-
tions of the Texas Tort Claims Act).
347. 931 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1991). See Pfeiffer & Hall, 1991 Annual Survey, supra note
4, at 1765-66 (discussing the Fifth Circuit's decision in Roadway Express).
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under the workers' compensation laws of Texas and, therefore, not re-
movable to federal court pursuant to federal law. 348 However, such a
claim may nevertheless be removed if it is pendent to a federal question
claim.349
In Continental Coffee Products Co. v. Cazarez,350 Juanita Cazarez sued
her former employer Continental Coffee, for allegedly discharging her in
retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. Cazarez suffered an
on-the-job injury and missed seven months of work while on workers'
compensation leave. On October 28, 1991, Cazarez called Continental
Coffee and informed them that she could not return to work until she
received molded shoe ankle supports, and that she had the flu. Cazarez
expected to receive the supports soon and to return to work on Monday,
November 4, 1991. She did not return on Monday and did not call Conti-
nental Coffee. Continental Coffee called her that day, but there was no
answer. Someone from Continental Coffee went to Cazarez's home and
was informed by her son that she was still sick. Later that week, she was
fired for violating the company's three-day no call/no show rule. There
was disputed testimony as to whether Continental Coffee called her to
inform her of her firing on November 7 or November 8. Cazarez did not
actually receive her required supports until after she was fired. 351 A jury
found in favor of Cazarez on her claim of retaliatory discharge, and
awarded actual and punitive damages. The court of appeals affirmed. On
appeal the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the award of actual damages
but reversed the award of punitive damages. 352
The Texas Supreme Court began its analysis by addressing the standard
of causation in workers' compensation retaliation cases. The court noted
that under the Whistleblower Act, which like workers' compensation
retaliation requires a plaintiff to prove the alleged discrimination oc-
curred "because" of the protected activity, the court prescribed the fol-
lowing jury instruction: "An employer does not discriminate against an
employee for reporting a violation of law, in good faith, to an appropriate
law enforcement authority, unless the employer's action would not have
occurred when it did had the report not been made. '353
The court held that a similar instruction should be given in actions
348. 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) (1994); Roadway Express, 931 F.2d at 1092; see Almanza v.
Transcontinental Ins. Co., 802 F. Supp. 1474, 1475 (N.D. Tex. 1992); Keyser v. Kroger Co.,
800 F. Supp. 476,477 (N.D. Tex. 1992); Addison v. Sedco Forex, U.S.A., 798 F. Supp. 1273,
1275 (N.D. Tex. 1992); see also Anderson v. American Airlines, Inc., 2 F.3d 590 (5th Cir.
1993).
349. See Cedillo v. Valcar Enters. & Darling Delaware Co., 773 F. Supp. 932, 939-42(N.D. Tex. 1991) (workers' compensation retaliation claim could be entertained when pen-
dent to a related and removable federal question claim under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act).
350. 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 172 (Dec. 13, 1996). See also Hall, 1996 Annual Survey, supra
note 145, at 979.
351. 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 173-74.
352. Id. at 181.
353. Id at 177.
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under the workers' compensation retaliation law. 354 The court held Con-
tinental Coffee could not be liable for workers' compensation retaliation
if the termination was required by the uniform enforcement of a reason-
able absenteeism policy, because it cannot be the case that the termina-
tion would not have occurred when it did but for the employee's assertion
of a compensation claim.355 The court found that there was some evi-
dence that Cazarez did not violate the three-day rule and thus, recovery
against Continental Coffee was proper.356
Finally, the court, found that the evidence was legally insufficient to
support an award of punitive damages. 357 For purposes of workers' com-
pensation retaliation, which is a statutory exception to at-will employ-
ment and must be strictly construed, a plaintiff who proves a statutory
violation must also prove actual malice, rather than implied malice, in
order to recover punitive damages. 358 "By requiring evidence of ill-will,
spite, or a specific intent to cause injury to the employee, courts will en-
sure that only egregious violations of the statute will be subject to puni-
tive awards. '359 The court held that there was no evidence of ill-will,
spite, or a specific intent to harm Cazarez.36°
In Johnson & Johnson Medical,361 Martha Sanchez sued her former
employer for retaliatory discharge in violation to the Workers' Compen-
sation Act. Sanchez went on a medical leave of absence after suffering an
on-the-job injury and eventually was placed on "indefinite medical lay-
off." She was informed that she had recall rights. On several occasions,
Johnson told Sanchez that while there was no job currently available, she
354. Ud; see Depriter v. Tom Thumb Stores, Inc., 931 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1996, writ denied) (jury instruction that plaintiff's burden was to show she was ter-
minated "because" of workers' compensation claim, did not require jury to find workers'
compensation claim was sole cause).
355. Continental Coffee, 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 177-78; see Deveaux v. Compaq Com-
puter Corp., No. 01-95-01104-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 19, 1996, no writ)(not designated for publication) 1996 WL 531959 (employee injured on the job was termi-
nated pursuant to uniform enforcement of a reasonable absence-control policy, summaryjudgment for Compaq affirmed); Terry v. Southern Floral Co., 927 S.W.2d 254 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ) (summary judgment for Southern Floral affirmed
following employee termination after approximately 9 months absence; no evidence of re-
taliatory motive).
356. Continental Coffee, 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 178. The court did, however, disapprove
of the court of appeals' reliance on the following facts as indicative of a negative attitude
by Continental Coffee towards Cazarez's injuries: the application for employment asked
whether the applicant had ever been on workers' compensation; Continental Coffee's file
questioned whether Cazarez's ankle injury might actually have been caused by back or
knee problems, or by wearing improper shoes; Continental Coffee's file indicated regular
communication with Cazarez, her doctor, and the insurance carrier during the period she
was out on workers' compensation, but no contact during the three-day absence period;
and Cazarez's impression was that Continental Coffee wanted her back at work instead of
at home receiving workers' compensation. Id. The court held that these facts were not
probative. I
357. Id.
358. Id. at 179-80.
359. Id. at 180.
360. Id.
361. 924 S.W.2d 925. See supra notes 220-24 and accompanying text.
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would be called back for the next available job. Johnson & Johnson
never called her back to work. Sanchez filed suit on April 1, 1991, and
the trial court granted summary judgment on her retaliation claim hold-
ing that it was barred by the statute of limitations. 362 The Texas Supreme
Court ultimately disagreed and held that a workers' compensation retali-
ation claim accrues when an employee receives unequivocal notice of ter-
mination, or when a reasonable person should have known of the
termination.363 Johnson & Johnson never unequivocally informed
Sanchez that she had been terminated 364
Creating a split between Texas courts of appeal, in Mitchell v. John
Wiesner, Inc.,365 the court held the after-acquired evidence defense does
not apply to workers' compensation retaliation claims.366 Vicki Mitchell
sued her employer John Wiesner, Inc. (Wiesner), claiming that she was
terminated for filing a workers' compensation claim. The evidence
showed that Mitchell stated on her application that she had a high school
diploma when in fact she did not. Wiesner put forth affidavit testimony
that Mitchell would not have been hired had Wiesner known she did not
have a high school diploma, and that lying on an employment application
was grounds for termination. The trial court granted summary judgment,
based on the after-acquired evidence rule, in favor of the employer and
the appellate court reversed. 367
In Davila v. Lockwood,368 Waldo Davila sued his former employer al-
leging he had been constructively discharged in retaliation for filing a
workers' compensation claim, and for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Both causes of action carry a two year statute of limitations and
Davila's employer moved for summary judgment, arguing the claims
were time barred. Relying on the principles that (a) limitations under
section 451.001 of the Labor Code commence when the employee re-
ceives unequivocal notice of his termination,369 and (b) constructive dis-
charge occurs when an employee's working conditions are made so
intolerable by the employer that the employee reasonably feels com-
pelled to resign,370 the court concluded that the date on which Davila
gave notice of his intent to resign was the date on which "Davila became
aware of his termination, albeit a constructive termination. '371 Because
notice of Davila's resignation occurred more than two years before com-
mencement of litigation, the court affirmed summary judgment for the
362. Id. at 927.
363. Id. at 929.
364. Id.
365. 923 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1996, no writ).
366. Id. at 264.
367. Id. Chief Justice C. J. Walker dissented and registered his support for applying the
after-acquired evidence defense in workers' compensation retaliation claims. Id. at 264-65.
In so doing, Justice Walker relied upon both federal and state authorities, including Jordan
v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 881 S.W.2d 363, 371 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied).
368. 933 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, no writ).
369. Id at 629.
370. Id. at 630.
371. Id.
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employer.372
In America West Airlines, Inc. v. Tope,373 Michael Tope sued his former
employer, America West Airlines (America West) for retaliatory dis-
charge subsequent to Tope's filing of a workers' compensation claim.
Following a serious injury, Tope's doctors advised him that he would not
likely be able to return to heavy manual labor. Shortly thereafter,
America West sent Tope a letter informing him that he was to be termi-
nated because of his unavailability unless a suitable job could be found
within approximately five weeks. Although Tope had not yet been re-
leased to light duty, America West offered him a baggage service repre-
sentative position or the opportunity to apply for positions in other cities.
Declining these options, Tope was terminated. At trial, the jury found
that Tope had been discriminatorily discharged for filing a workers' com-
pensation claim. America West appealed asserting that the evidence was
legally insufficient to support the jury's award. Relying on Tope's ability
to establish a causal connection "by circumstantial evidence and by rea-
sonable inferences arising from it"374 the court found sufficient evidence
to clearly exceed that necessary to support the jury verdict. 375 The court
first categorized the types of circumstantial evidence recognized as sup-
porting a finding of unlawful discrimination:
(1) the employer's knowledge of the compensation claim by those
making the decision to terminate; (2) a negative attitude towards the
employee's injured condition; (3) failure to follow company policy in
disciplining the employee; (4) discriminatory treatment of the in-
jured employee compared to other employees with the same discipli-
nary problems; and (5) providing incentives to refrain from reporting
on-the-job injuries. 376
Applying these factors, the court examined the circumstantial evidence
sufficient to establish a causal connection between Tope's workers' com-
pensation claim and his discharge. 377 For example, the people who fired
Tope knew of his compensation claim; Tope presented evidence that
America West had fired others with workers-compensation claims; and
the record contained extensive evidence of the airline's negative attitude
towards Tope's injury.378 Tope was also able to bring forward evidence
that America West discriminatorily treated him as opposed to other em-
ployees who were unable to perform their usual duties.379 Finally, the
372. Id.
373. No. 08-95-00389-CV, 1996 WL 663559 (Tex. App.-El Paso Nov. 14, 1996, n.w.h.)
(not released for publication).
374. Id. at *3.
375. Id. at *5.
376. Id. at *3 (citing Paragon, 783 S.W.2d at 658-59).
377. Id. at *4.
378. Id. Examples included the airline's risk manager stating that the claim was costing
the company a lot of money, the fact that the date of the letter sent Tope and his date of
termination were before he was released to return to work, Tope's termination papers were
prepared long before June 1, on the same day that Tope's claim became the second highest




court noted that America West's employment application asked for more
information on workers-compensation claims than for non-job related in-
juries and that the company had a retro workers' compensation policy in
which their own money was at stake. All this evidence combined to pro-
vide the more than a scintilla of evidence needed to defeat America
West's legal sufficiency challenge. 380
In Bouchet v. Texas Mexican Railway Co.,381 Lawrence Bouchet sued
his employer, Texas Mexican Railway (Railway), for discriminating
against him after he filed a Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) law-
suit for personal injuries. Because the employer was a railroad, FELA
was Bouchet's only remedy for his on the job injuries. Covered under
FELA, the employer-railroad was thus not a subscriber under the Work-
ers' Compensation Act. Since Bouchet was injured in the course of his
employment, Railway continued his salary, paid his medical bills, and
paid his travel expenses from Laredo to San Antonio so that Bouchet
could see the appropriate specialists. After Bouchet filed his lawsuit,
Railway stopped paying salary and travel expenses, but continued to pay
Bouchet's medical bills. Bouchet amended his suit to include a wrongful
discrimination suit under section 451.001 of the Texas Labor Code.382
The court of appeals dismissed Railway's contention that a wrongful dis-
crimination suit is not proper in a FELA case. 383 The court of appeals
reasoned that section 451.001 applied to all employers, no matter if they
are subscribers or non-subscribers under the Workers' Compensation
Act.384 The court found that section 451.001 anti-discrimination and anti-
retaliation mandates are independent statutory wrongs separate and
apart from workers' compensation claims.385 The court stated that there
is no "reason to prohibit retaliatory wrongful discrimination by a sub-
scribing employer, but to let all other employers discriminate with impu-
nity. '386 Having decided that a section 451.001 wrongful discrimination
suit was properly brought against Railway despite non-subscriber status,
the court noted that all of the Railway representatives agreed that em-
ployees were treated differently based on whether they exercised their
legal rights.3 87 Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed and remanded,
holding that the jury's finding of no wrongful discrimination was against
the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. 388
In Castro,38 9 Maria Castro appealed from an award of summary judg-
ment granted to Hyatt on her claim of retaliatory discharge for filing a
workers-compensation claim. In October 1990, Castro suffered an on-
380. Id.
381. 915 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ granted).
382. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 451.001 (Vernon 1996).
383. Bouchet, 915 S.W.2d at 113.
384. Id. at 111.
385. Id. at 110.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 113.
388. Id.
389. 1996 WL 348178; see also supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
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the-job injury, and filed a claim for and received workers' compensation
benefits. On September 4, 1991, Castro was granted her third medical
leave, which was extended for sixty days through November 16, 1991, or
until Castro was released to light duty. On April 15, 1992, Hyatt sent
Castro a letter informing her that she had failed to request an extension
of her leave, that she was considered a "voluntary quit," and that she was
terminated pursuant to an administrative termination because she re-
mained on leave for more than 180 days. On April 24, 1992, Castro pro-
vided Hyatt with a note releasing her to work with no restrictions
effective April 23. Hyatt told her that she had been removed from the
payroll but was eligible to reapply. Castro refused and filed suit.
Castro attempted to show a causal link between her discharge and her
workers' compensation claim by alleging that Hyatt management and su-
pervisors became abrupt and unfriendly after they learned she had hired
an attorney to represent her. The court held such evidence to be mere
speculation and insufficient to controvert Hyatt's legitimate reason for
discharge. 390 Castro further argued that her last leave of absence form
extended until she was released to light-duty work and that Hyatt devi-
ated from policy in allowing her such an open-ended leave. The court,
however, noted that Castro's last leave of absence request form indicated
that the employee would be terminated if he did not return or obtain an
approved extension, and that Castro's termination was pursuant to Hy-
att's policy of administrative termination for leaves over 180 days.391 Be-
cause Castro offered no causal link summary judgment for Hyatt was
affirmed.392
In Deninger v. Vought Aircraft Co., 39 3 David Deninger sued Vought
Aircraft Co. (Vought) for wrongful discharge in retaliation for filing a
workers' compensation claim. Deninger filed workers' compensation
claims in May 1989 and July 1991 for eye and back injuries. The claims
were settled in August 1992. In February 1993, Deninger was accused of
sexual harassment. Deninger was terminated in April 1993 because of his
harassing conduct. The court of appeals held that summary judgment was
proper as to Deninger's workers' compensation retaliation claim.394 If an
employer establishes a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the ter-
mination and the employee fails to show any evidence of a retaliatory
motive, then an employer is entitled to summary judgment.395 Deninger
claimed that Vought was not entitled to summary judgment because of
the weakness of the evidence about the sexual harassment claim, a docu-
ment showed Vought was concerned about his excessive medical leave,
390. Id. at *3.
391. Id. at *2-3.
392. Id. at *4.
393. No. 05-95-00469-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas Apr. 30, 1996, no writ) (not designated
for publication) 1996 WL 223690.
394. Id. at *7.
395. Id. at *6.
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and Vought was out to get him. 396 The court held -that the weakness of
the evidence regarding the sexual harassment claim attacked the validity
of Vought's reason but did not implicate retaliation for the workers' com-
pensation claims.397 There was no evidence that Vought was out to get
Deninger because of his workers' compensation claims and concerns
about excessive medical leave did not link Deninger's termination to his
workers' compensation claim-displeasure about time away from work is
not the same as displeasure with filing workers' compensation claims. 398
In Guneratne v. St. Mary's Hospital,399 Barbara Guneratne sued St.
Mary's Hospital (St. Mary's) claiming that she was subjected to illegal
retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. Guneratne was a
registered nurse who injured her back in August 1993, while attempting
to lift a patient. She attempted to return to work in June 1994. Her doc-
tor release stated that she was to do no heavy lifting. St. Mary's policy
required a full release in order to return an employee to work. The court
held that Guneratne failed to show a causal link between her filing of a
workers' compensation claim and St. Mary's decision to not allow her to
return to work.400 The court concluded that the overwhelming evidence
supported the conclusion that Guneratne was not able to return to work
because she was physically unable to perform the essential functions of
her job.40 1
In Munoz,40 2 Joe Munoz was terminated from his job as an oil delivery
driver with H&M Wholesale, Inc. (H&M) after sustaining a back injury.
Munoz sued H&M for, among other things, workers' compensation retal-
iation. Munoz claimed that after the injury, H&M's secretary told
Munoz's wife that it would have been better if Munoz had just claimed
his back injury on his personal health insurance rather than filing a work-
ers' compensation claim. Munoz further claimed that when he suffered a
prior on-the-job injury, H&M's manager told him not to file a workers'
compensation claim, stating unequivocally that the president of H&M did
not want anyone to file workers' compensation claims and that anyone
who did would be fired. In addition, Munoz alleged that on the day that
he was terminated, the vice president of H&M told Munoz that he was
being discharged because H&M was afraid that Munoz would reinjure his
back. The court concluded that Munoz presented sufficient evidence
396. Id. at *7.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. 943 F. Supp. 771 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
400. Id. at 775.
401. Id.; see Hamilton v. Harris County Hosp. Dist., No. 14-95-00204-CV (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 15, 1996, writ denied) (not designated for publication) 1996 WL
460194, at *2-3 (policy placing employees "Out of Service" after extended absence applica-
ble only to employees injured on the job established causal link; however, employer termi-
nated pursuant to legitimate reason when employee terminated who can no longer perform
essential functions of the job). Employers subject to the Americans with Disabilities Act
and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act should, however, evaluate such decisions
pursuant to their obligations of reasonable accommodation under these statutes.
402. 926 F. Supp. at 596; see also supra notes 133-141 and accompanying text.
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from which it could be iiferred that the requisite causal link existed be-
tween his pursuit of workers' compensation benefits and his discharge,
and that summary judgment on Munoz's claim of retaliatory discharge
was not proper.40 3
In Peoples v. Dallas Baptist University,40 4 Jamie L. Peoples sued Dallas
Baptist University (the University) alleging that she was terminated in
retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. Peoples worked as a
custodial housekeeper which required her presence Monday through Fri-
day during normal business hours. Following a workplace injury, Peoples
missed work and her supervisor requested from her a written plan on
how to resolve her attendance problem. Peoples never responded and
instead requested one day of leave without pay, which was denied. Peo-
ples took the day anyway, explaining that whenever she had a doctor's
appointment she was going to take off (her appointment was unrelated to
her on-the-job injury) whether or not she had permission. Peoples was
terminated because of her frequent and erratic absenteeism, her failure to
follow the absence policy and insubordination to her supervisors. The
appellate court upheld the summary judgment entered in favor of the
University. 40 5 The court concluded that the record established as a mat-
ter of law a legitimate reason for the termination, namely insubordina-
tion, and that Peoples failed to offer any controverting evidence of a
causal link between her termination and her claim of injury. The court
further held that termination for excessive absenteeism does not raise a
material fact issue establishing the causal link required in a retaliatory
discharge claim.406
In Stephens,40 7 Delhi Gas Pipeline (Delhi) claimed that it terminated
Stephens for violating the company's conflict of interest policy in that he
used a company employee to install a gasket on Stephens' personal air
compressor while on company time. Stephens asserted that Delhi termi-
nated him because he developed a health problem from exposure to hy-
drogen sulfide gas on the job and was contemplating making a claim for
workers' compensation benefits. Stephens admitted that he did ask a
company employee to install a gasket for him, but stated that it was cus-
tomary for Delhi employees to perform small tasks for one another and
that Delhi never before discharged anyone for that reason. Following his
termination, Stephens filed suit against Delhi alleging retaliatory dis-
charge. The trial court granted Delhi's motion for summary judgment on
both claims, and Stephens appealed.
With regard to Stephens' claim for retaliatory discharge, Delhi claimed
that Stephens conceded that his health complaints were not work related
and that Stephens did not disclose his health problems to Delhi. The
403. Id. at 610.
404. 1996 WL 253340; see also supra note 61.
405. Id. at *5.
406. Id. at *4.
407. 924 S.W.2d 765; see also supra notes 183-91 and accompanying text.
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court noted, however, that there was evidence that Stephens discussed his
health problems with company officials. 408 Further, Stephens' conclusion
as a layman that his condition was not work related was not dispositive on
the issue.409 The court added that the summary judgment evidence that
Stephens told his supervisors about his exposure to gas on the job, and his
related health problems, at least raised an inference that Delhi discharged
Stephens because of his potential workers' compensation claim.410 Be-
cause Stephens raised sufficient controverting evidence to raise a fact is-
sue, the court concluded that summary judgment on Stephens' retaliatory
discharge claim was error.4 11
In Jones v. City of McKinney,4 12 Michael Jones sued the City of McKin-
ney (City) claiming that he was terminated because he filed a workers'
compensation claim. Jones worked for the City as a firefighter. He in-
jured his back and was unable to return to work as a firefighter. Two
years after his back injury and four months after he settled his workers'
compensation claim, the City terminated him. The appellate court ren-
dered a take-nothing judgment for the City.41 3 The court noted that an
"employee need only show that his workers' compensation claim contrib-
uted in some way to the company's termination decision. '414 Jones had
no direct evidence and relied on circumstantial evidence to prove his
case. In support he showed that the City hired a temporary replacement
in the same month that Jones settled his workers' compensation claim
and that the City would not accommodate his injury by offering him a
driver-only job as suggested by his doctor. The City established, how-
ever, that the temporary employee was told that he would be fired if
Jones returned to work. Furthermore, there was no such position as a
permanent driver and drivers were required at times to lift more than
Jones' restrictions allowed. Jones presented no evidence (1) that the City
failed to adhere to established policies, (2) that he was discriminatorily
treated in comparison to similarly situated employees, or (3) that the
stated reason for the discharge was false, which are other traditional
forms of circumstantial proof in a workers' compensation claim case. The
court concluded that there was no evidence that Jones' workers' compen-
sation claim contributed to the City's decision to terminate him.415
2. Commission on Human Rights
In Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. DeMoranville,416 Lorraine DeMoranville
was demoted when the company with which she was employed was




412. No. 05-94-00720-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas Nov. 22, 1996, writ requested) (not desig-
nated for publication), 1996 WL 682453.
413. Id at *1.
414. Id. at *2.
415. Id. at *6.
416. 933 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. 1996).
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bought by another company. DeMoranville alleged that her new supervi-
sor discriminated against her by favoring younger workers and by requir-
ing her to work after hours, thereby creating a hostile work environment
and causing her stress. DeMoranville took medical leave because of the
stress and when her condition did not improve, she applied for short-term
disability. On May 10, 1991, Specialty Retailers, Inc. (SRI) advised
DeMoranville that she was being replaced and that she would be fired if
her leave of absence lasted longer than one year. DeMoranville did not
return to work within one year and was terminated in May, 1992. On
June 2, 1992, DeMoranville filed an age discrimination complaint with the
Texas Commission on Human Rights (TCHR). After DeMoranville filed
suit, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of SRI on
DeMoranville's age discrimination claim. The appeals court reversed,
holding that because the termination of DeMoranville's employment in
May of 1992 could be considered to be an act of discrimination, there was
a fact issue as to whether DeMoranville's June 1992 complaint to the
TCHR was timely.417 SRI appealed and the Texas Supreme Court re-
versed and rendered. 418
The supreme court explained that a charge of discrimination under the
Texas Commission on Human Rights Act must be filed within 180 days of
the alleged unlawful employment practice.4 19 "[T]he proper focus is
upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the
consequences of the acts become most painful. ' 420 The court concluded
that the termination of DeMoranville's employment after a one year
leave of absence, if discriminatory at all, could only be considered an ef-
fect of past discrimination.421 The actual termination of DeMoranville's
employment was not an unlawful act because it was the result of a neutral
company policy addressing long term leaves of absence. 422
The court added:
Even if the termination of DeMoranville's employment in 1992 could
be considered a discriminatory act, her complaint was nevertheless
untimely because she was notified on May 10, 1991, that she would
be terminated if she did not return to work within one year of the
start of her medical leave.4 23
The court concluded that the limitations period began when
DeMoranville was informed of the claimed discriminatory employment
action, not when the action came to fruition.424
In Price v. Philadelphia American Life Insurance,425 Joanne Price sued
her employer for race and sex discrimination alleging a violation of the
417. Id. at 492.
418. Id. at 493.
419. Id. at 492.
420. Id. (citing Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980)).




425. 934 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, n.w.h.).
1997] 1159
SMU LAW REVIEW
Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). Price filed an
EEOC Charge of Discrimination. The heading on the Charge of Dis-
crimination was "Texas Commission on Human Rights and EEOC." The
charge was forwarded from the EEOC to the TCHR with the message
"[p]ursuant to the worksharing agreement, this charge is to be investi-
gated by the EEOC. '426 The director of the TCHR signed the transmit-
tal form and checked the box that provided: "This will acknowledge
receipt of the referenced charge and indicate this Agency's intention not
to initially investigate the charge. '427 The trial court dismissed Price's
case, holding that she failed to file a complaint with the TCHR. 42s The
court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for trial.429 The court
noted that the Worksharing Agreement entered into between the EEOC
and the TCHR provided that the EEOC is the TCHR's limited agent for
the purpose of receiving charges. 430 Thus, the court found that Price
complied with the requirements of filing a complaint with the TCHR as a
prerequisite to litigation.431
In Morton v. GTE North Inc.,432 Linda Morton, alleging disability dis-
crimination, sued GTE North, Inc. (GTE) for violations of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the TCHRA. Morton was employed by
GTE as a programmer. Morton suffered bouts of depression, which she
claimed were brought on by increased job stress, and therefore requested
transfer to a less stressful position. Unable to find another vacant, less
stressful programming job, Morton continued in her position. After Mor-
ton's mental condition deteriorated, Morton requested and was granted
short-term disability leave (STD). Morton then applied and was ap-
proved for long-term disability (LTD) benefits under a private disability
policy. Pursuant to its policy of terminating any employee requiring more
than six months of STD or ninety days of leave for any other purpose,
GTE terminated Morton.
Morton and GTE both moved for summary judgment. Granting
GTE's motion as to all Morton's claims, the court explained that the
TCHRA should be interpreted as coextensive with the ADA, and that
the motions for summary judgment should be decided using the ADA
case law.433 Accordingly, the court first addressed whether Morton was a
"qualified individual with a disability" eligible to bring the subject ADA/
TCHRA claim. "A qualified individual with a disability is a disabled em-
ployee who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
426. Id. at 772.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 771.
429. Id. at 774.
430. Id. at 773.
431. Id. at 774.
432. 922 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
433. Id. at 1183; see Trico Technologies Corp. v. Rodriguez, 907 S.W.2d 650, 652-53
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no writ) (the court may look to federal case law in inter-
preting the TCHRA).
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essential functions of the job she holds or desires. '434 Morton argued
that GTE failed to reasonably accommodate her by refusing her requests
for a transfer to a more structured setting and by failing to contact her
while on STD to offer these options. 435 The court disagreed. GTE and
Morton investigated the possibility of Morton's transfer to a less stressful
programming position, but they were unable to find any such position
that Morton could perform.436 The court held that because no suitable,
vacant position was available, GTE was under no duty to grant Morton a
transfer.437 The court also held that GTE reasonably accommodated
Morton's request for a more structured work setting when it complied
fully with Morton's doctor's memorandum stating that Morton should
work limited overtime for a period of three weeks.4 38 The court con-
cluded that GTE had no obligation, under these circumstances, to accom-
modate Morton further during her STD leave. 439
Finally, the court addressed whether Morton's representations of disa-
bility in order to receive STD and LTD benefits estopped her from claim-
ing to be a qualified individual with a disability."40 The court declined to
adopt strict estoppel, instead opting for considering such representations
as factors to be weighed in determining whether a fact question ex-
isted.441 Applying this standard, the court concluded Morton could not
be considered a qualified individual with a disability, where she continu-
ously represented her disability as preventing her to perform her job." 2
Concluding that Morton failed to raise a fact question as to whether she
could perform the essential functions of any position at GTE, the court
held that, as a matter of law, Morton was not a qualified individual with a
disability and thus, did not have standing to bring suit under the ADA/
TCHRA for wrongful termination.443
In Mackey,"4 Glenda Mackey sued U.P. Enterprises, Inc. (UPE) for,
among other things, sexual harassment in violation of the Texas Commis-
sion on Human Rights Act. Mackey alleged that while she was employed
by UPE under the supervision of Ron Smith and Greg Johnson, she was
sexually harassed by both. Mackey alleged that both Smith and Johnson
asked her to have sexual intercourse with them, perform sexual favors for
them, used sexually explicit language, and retaliated against Mackey
when she rejected their advances. This included threats of termination if
she reported these events. After complaining to two store managers
about Johnson, Mackey was fired. The trial court granted summary judg-
434. Morton, 922 F. Supp. at 1178.
435. Id. at 1179.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id. at 1180.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 1181.
441. Id. at 1182.
442. Id. at 1182-83.
443. Id. at 1183.
444. 935 S.W.2d 446; see also supra notes 286-93 and accompanying text.
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ment against Mackey on all of her causes of action, and Mackey ap-
pealed. The appeals court reversed the trial court's judgment on the
sexual harassment claim and remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.4 5
To establish a claim for hostile environment sexual harassment, the em-
ployee must show that: (1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) that she
was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment, (3) that the sexual har-
assment was based upon sex, (4) that the harassment affected a term,
condition, or privilege of employment, and (5) respondeat superior (i.e.,
that the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in ques-
tion and failed to take prompt remedial action)." 6 Based on the evi-
dence presented of sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
physical and verbal conduct, the working conditions at issue inevitably
created an abusive and intolerable working environment at Mackey's
workplace and created a genuine issue of material fact as to Mackey's
sexual harassment claim.447 Likewise, based on the evidence of hours of
work, pay, and employment status being conditioned upon response to
these sexual activities, the court held that a genuine issue of material fact
existed "as to whether the sexual harassment created a hostile work envi-
ronment and whether the harassment involved a quid pro quo in the
work place, affecting Mackey's economic benefits." 448
With regard to the fifth element of the sexual harassment claim, that
Mackey show that the employer knew or should have known of the har-
assment in question and failed to take prompt remedial action, the court
explained that an employee can demonstrate that the "employer knew of
the harassment by showing that she complained to 'higher management'
of the harassment, or by showing the pervasiveness of the harassment
which gives rise to the inference of knowledge or constructive knowledge
by the employer. '"" 9 Noting evidence that Mackey complained of the
harassment to a management level employee without result, together
with evidence of UPE's awareness of increased sexual harassment
problems in the work place, the court held that a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact existed as to whether or not UPE knew or should have known of
the harassment and failed to remedy the situation promptly.450 The court
also explained that even though Mackey failed to follow the procedure
for complaints set forth in the sexual harassment policy, UPE's having a
policy against discrimination and a grievance process, combined with
Mackey's failure to utilize that process, did not protect UPE from
liability.451
445. Id. at 462.
446. Id. at 456.
447. Id. at 457.
448. Id.
449. Id. (citation omitted).
450. Id. at 458.
451. Id. at 457.
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In Rios,4 52 David Rios was employed as an assistant vice president and
commercial loan officer for Texas Commerce Bancshares, Inc. (TCB).
Following his termination for unsatisfactory job performance, Rios sued
TCB for national origin discrimination under the Texas Commission on
Human Rights Act. TCB moved for and was granted summary judgment
on Rios's discrimination claim, and Rios appealed.
The appeals court explained that "[o]nce the plaintiff has established a
prima facie case [of employment discrimination], the burden of produc-
tion shifts to the employer to articulate legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons for any allegedly unequal treatment. '453 If legitimate, non-dis-
criminatory reasons are shown by the employer, the burden then shifts
back to the plaintiff to establish that the reasons put forth by the em-
ployer are a pretext for unlawful discrimination.45 4 Further, even though
the burden of production shifts, the burden of persuasion remains with
the plaintiff the whole time.455 The appeals court held that even if it were
to assume that Rios established a prima facie case, Rios did not provide
any evidence showing that TCB's actual motive was to discriminate
against him.4 5 6 The appeals court concluded that summary judgment was
proper as to Rios's claim of discrimination because the plaintiff produced
no evidence disproving that Rios was discharged for poor job perform-
ance, insubordinate conduct, and violation of bank policy.457 Further-
more, Rios did not produce "evidence of severe or pervasive conduct
indicating that the environment at TCB could be objectively viewed as
hostile to Hispanics." 45 8
III. NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS
Generally, an agreement not to compete is a restraint of trade and is
unenforceable because it violates public policy.459 The Texas Constitu-
tion declares that monopolies created by the state or a political subdivi-
sion are not permitted because they are contrary to the "genius of a free
government. "460 In 1889, the Texas Legislature enacted its first antitrust
law and it remained almost unchanged until the passage of the Texas Free
452. 930 S.W.2d 809; see supra notes 42-47, 157-59, 304-07 and accompanying text for a
discussion of facts and additional causes of action asserted in Rios.




457. Id. at 819.
458. Id.
459. Travel Masters, Inc. v. Star Tours, Inc., 827 S.W.2d 830, 832 (Tex. 1991); Juliette
Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Assocs., Inc., 793 S.W.2d 660, 662 (Tex. 1990); Martin v.
Credit Protection Ass'n, Inc., 793 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex. 1990); DeSantis v. Wackenhut
Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 681 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 755 (1991); Weatherford Oil
Tool Co. v. A. G. Campbell, 161 Tex. 310, 312, 340 S.W.2d 950, 951 (1960); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 186 (1981)). For a thorough analysis of the enforceability of
noncompetition agreements, see Philip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall, Employment and
Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 1721, 1789-95 (1992).
460. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 26.
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Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983.461 Generally, this legislation pro-
hibits contracts, combinations or conspiracies that unreasonably restrain
trade or commerce.462 Historically, Texas courts have closely scrutinized
private sector contracts which restrain trade.463 However, the Covenant
Not to Compete Act 464 protects noncompetition agreements if they meet
certain statutory criteria.465
The courts continue to show disfavor of covenants not to compete as an
unreasonable intrusion on free enterprise.466 In CRC-Evans Pipeline In-
461. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.01-.51 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1987 & Supp.
1993).
462. The Texas Supreme Court noted in DeSantis that while a noncompetition agree-
ment is a restraint on trade, only those contracts that unreasonably restrain trade violate
the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 687.
463. See, e.g., Peat Marwick Main & Co. v. Haass, 818 S.W.2d 381, 385-86 (Tex. 1991);
Queens Ins. Co. v. State, 86 Tex. 250, 24 S.W. 397 (1893); Ladd v. Southern Cotton Press &
Mfg. Co., 53 Tex. 172 (1880); Miller Paper Co. v. Roberts Paper Co., 901 S.W.2d 593, 602
(Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, no writ). See Pfeiffer & Hall, 1991 Annual Survey, supra note
4, at 378-83 (analyzing factors).
464. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
465. The Covenant Not to Compete Act provides:
If the covenant is found to be ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable
agreement but contains limitations as to time, geographical area, and scope
of activity to be restrained that are not reasonable and impose a greater re-
straint than is necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of
the promisee, the court shall reform the covenant to the extent necessary to
cause the limitations contained in the covenant as to time, geographical area,
and scope of activity to be restrained to be reasonable and to impose a re-
straint that is not greater than necessary to protect the goodwill or other
business interest of the promisee and enforce the covenant as reformed ....
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.51(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
466. In Centel Cellular Company v. Light, 883 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1994), the court's exam-
ination of an "at-will" employee's covenant not to compete was two-fold: (1) is there an
otherwise enforceable agreement, to which (2) the covenant not to compete is ancillary at
the time the agreement is made. Examining the first issue the court determined that while
a promise dependent on future employment might be illusory in an employment-at-will
relationship, other promises between an employer and employee would not be illusory;
herein, a promise of specialized training, a promise of 14 days notice before termination,
and a promise to provide an employee inventory upon termination. Such promises which
were not illusory satisfied the first requirement of "an otherwise enforceable agreement."
Addressing the second issue, the court determined that a covenant is not ancillary to a
contract unless it is designed to enforce a parties' contractual obligation. Stated affirma-
tively, the court held a covenant not to compete is an enforceable agreement provided: (1)
the consideration given by the employer in the otherwise enforceable agreement gives rise
to the employer's interest in restraining the employee from competing; and (2) the cove-
nant is designed to enforce the employee's consideration or return promise in the other-
wise enforceable agreement. In the absence of both elements, the covenant is
unenforceable. Under these standards, the court held that the covenant between Light and
Centel was not ancillary to an otherwise enforceable agreement between them. While
Centel's promise to train might involve confidential information, the covenant was not
designed to enforce any of Light's return promises, i.e., Light did not promise to not dis-
close such confidential information. Thus, the court held the covenant not to compete was
not enforceable.
On remand, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that no evidence existed to show that
Centel tortiously interfered with Light's future employment contracts, thus, the court ren-
dered judgment for Centel. The court stated that Centel exercised what it believed at the
time to be a bona fide legal right within the context of an agreement it had with Light;
therefore, there was no evidence to support the element of malice.
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ternational, Inc. v. Myers, 4 6 7 Randolph Myers and Bobby Sanford (De-
fendants) were former employees of CRC-Evans Pipeline International,
Inc. (CRC). At the time that Defendants were employed, they each
signed at-will employment agreements containing covenants not to com-
pete by which Defendants agreed not to engage in any business that was
in direct competition with CRC for a period of two years following termi-
nation of employment with CRC. In addition, Defendants agreed not to
disclose trade secrets or confidential information of CRC, to return all
materials of CRC at termination, and to disclose to CRC all technological
ideas, inventions, improvements, and discoveries related to any present
or prospective business of CRC. In return, CRC promised employment
and the payment of a salary and/or other remuneration. CRC also im-
pliedly promised to give Defendants trade secrets and proprietary infor-
mation necessary to perform their duties. Defendants later terminated
their employments with CRC, and both became employed by businesses
in direct competition with CRC. CRC filed suit against Defendants alleg-
ing that Defendants breached the written covenants not to compete. The
trial court denied CRC's request for a temporary injunction, and CRC
appealed.
The appellate court affirmed the denial of the temporary injunction.468
The court explained that pursuant to Texas law,4 69 in order for a covenant
not to compete to be enforceable, it must be "ancillary to or part of an
otherwise enforceable agreement at the time the agreement is made. '470
The court explained that the issue is whether, "'at the time the agreement
is made,' there exists other mutually binding promises to which the cove-
nant not to compete is ancillary or part and parcel. '471 Defendants both
worked for CRC in the past, one for five years and one for six years.
Each signed the agreements after being re-employed by CRC and did not
receive any new trade secrets or confidential information upon returning
to work with CRC. Accordingly, the appellate court held that the trial
court could reasonably have concluded that there was no need for, and no
duty to provide, initial specialized training to Defendant immediately
upon their signing of the employment agreements. 472 The trial court
could have concluded that, at most, there was an implied promise to pro-
vide Defendants specialized training at some later time during their em-
ployment, if it was ever needed.473 The court concluded that such a
promise to perform by CRC was illusory "at the time the employment
agreements were signed" because CRC could discharge the Defendants
and avoid the duty to perform.474 The court thus concluded that the trial
467. 927 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ). For an additional
discussion of CRC-Evans Pipeline, see text accompanying infra notes 501-05.
468. Id. at 266.
469. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996)
470. CRC-Evans Pipeline, 927 S.W.2d at 263.
471. Id.





court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the covenants
not to compete were not enforceable because they were not "ancillary to
or part of otherwise enforceable agreements," as required by the Texas
UCC. 47 5
In Emmons v. Stewart Glass & Mirror, Inc.,476 Emmons and his em-
ployer, Stewart Glass & Mirror, Inc. (Stewart Glass), entered into an at-
will employment agreement that included a covenant not to compete.
After Emmons voluntarily resigned his employment with Stewart Glass,
he began working for a competitor in direct violation of the covenant.
Stewart Glass sought and obtained an injunction enjoining Emmons from
violating the covenant not to compete, and Emmons appealed.
The court reasoned that because the employment agreement contem-
plated an at-will employment relationship, and thus did not bind either
party to a specific term of employment, the covenant not to compete was
not ancillary to an otherwise enforceable agreement and was unenforce-
able as a matter of law.477 The court added that because each and every
promise made by the employer and employee was dependent upon Em-
mons' commencement and continuation of employment, the agreement
was illusory and unenforceable. 47 8 Furthermore, the record was void of
any evidence that Emmons was made privy to any trade secrets, customer
lists, customer information, or good will, and Stewart Glass presented no
evidence of any need to protect a legitimate interest that would justify the
hardship of the restriction upon Emmons.479 Accordingly, the court of
appeals held the temporary injunction ordered by the district court re-
versed and dissolved.480
In Grove Temporary Service, Inc. v. Steger,481 Grove Temporary Ser-
vice, Inc. (Grove) hired Cindie Steger as a full-time employee. A few
weeks after being hired, Steger signed an employment contract that in-
cluded a covenant not to compete for two years following termination of
her employment with Grove. Six days after Steger's termination, she ac-
cepted employment with one of Grove's competitors. Grove sought a
temporary injunction, which the trial court denied, and Grove appealed.
Affirming the trial court's judgment, the appeals court explained that
pursuant to section 15.50 of the Texas UCC,482 a covenant not to compete
is not enforceable unless it is ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforce-
able agreement at the time the agreement is made.48 3 By itself, an at-will
employment contract does not constitute an "otherwise enforceable
475. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
476. No. 09-95-119-CV (Tex. App.-Beaumont Jan. 25, 1996, no writ) (not designated
for publication), 1996 WL 27935.
477. Id. at *3.
478. Id.
479. Id. at *4.
480. Id.
481. No. 05-95-01788-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas Apr. 11, 1996, no writ) (not designated
for publication), 1996 WL 167922.
482. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
483. Stegar, 1996 WL 167922 at *1-2.
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agreement" because it is not binding on either the employer or the em-
ployee.484 An at-will employment contract may become an otherwise en-
forceable agreement where independent consideration is given in
exchange for a promise and the consideration is not illusory.485 In order
for a covenant not to compete to be ancillary to an otherwise enforceable
agreement, "(1) the consideration given by the employer in the otherwise
enforceable agreement must give rise to the employer's interest in re-
straining the employee from competing, and (2) the covenant must be
designed to enforce the employee's consideration or return promise in
the otherwise enforceable agreement. '486
The appellate court concluded that the trial court did not abuse his
discretion in determining that the covenant not to compete was not ancil-
lary to or part of an otherwise enforceable agreement. 487 The court
noted that there was evidence that the alleged trade secrets involved
practices that were offered by many similar companies in the area, and
there was evidence that the markup information alleged to be proprietary
information was often told to customers.488 In addition, the customer
lists alleged to be proprietary information were compiled in the same
method that most companies compiled their customer lists and were
made accessible to employees who did not sign noncompetition
agreements. 489
Scope and reasonableness of the restrictions are, at times, the subject
of the dispute. In Deaton v. United Mobile Networks L.P.,490 United Mo-
bile Networks (United), a two-way radio business, filed suit against
Ronny Deaton and Barbara Deaton, United's former employees, for
breach of a covenant not to compete. Ronny Deaton left United and
took with him a copy of United's customer list. A month later, his wife
Barbara Deaton was fired by United and she started her own two-way
radio business, and hired her husband as an employee. The appellate
court upheld the jury's finding that a covenant not to compete existed.491
The court further held that the trial court's reformation of the agreement
was proper. The covenant contained a geographic limitation of 150 miles
outside the boundary of the business activity, which would have excluded
Deaton from all of northeast Texas. 492 The trial court reformed the cove-
nant to a 100 mile radius. 493 Because the covenant was reformed, dam-
ages for breach of the covenant were not available for breaches occurring
before the reformation.494 The court remanded the case to the trial court
484. Id. at *2.
485. Id.
486. Id. (quoting Centel Cellular, 833 S.W.2d at 647).
487. Id. at *3.
488. Id.
489. Id.
490. 926 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, no writ).
491. Id. at 761.





to determine if Deaton's taking of a copy of the customer list constituted
conversion. 495
In John R. Ray & Sons, Inc. v. Stroman,4 96 Robert Stroman brought a
declaratory judgment action claiming that a covenant not to compete was
unenforceable. The covenant at issue excluded Stroman from competi-
tion within Harris County and all adjacent counties for a period of five
years from the date of the agreement. It also provided that Stroman
would never solicit or accept, or assist or be employed by any other party
in soliciting or accepting insurance business from any of Ray & Sons'
accounts. The court held that the covenant not to compete was unen-
forceable. 497 The court found that the covenant was an industry wide
exclusion on Stroman's ability to work in the insurance business in and
around Harris County.498 The court held that industry wide exclusions
are unreasonable and that the part of the covenant pertaining to Ray &
Sons' accounts was unlimited in time and was, therefore, unenforce-
able. 499 Noting that once a covenant not to compete is found to be unen-
forceable, the court may be required to reform the agreement.500 Herein,
however, the covenant not to compete could not be reformed because (1)
the portion of the covenant that operated as an industry wide exclusion
expired prior to judgment in the case, and (2) the portion pertaining to
Ray & Sons' accounts failed to show what, if any, reformation would be
reasonable and necessary to protect the goodwill or other business inter-
est of Ray & Sons.
A. BEYOND NON-COMPETITION AGREEMENTS
In CRC-Evans Pipeline,50 1 Defendants agreed not to disclose to any-
one outside CRC trade secrets or confidential information during or after
their employment with CRC. After Defendants terminated their employ-
ments with CRC and were employed by competitors, CRC sued, seeking
an injunction prohibiting defendants from disclosing CRC's trade secrets.
Affirming the trial court's denial of a temporary injunction, the court ex-
plained that (1) Defendants both worked for CRC in the past, one for
five years and one for six years, and (2) each signed the confidentiality
agreements after being re-employed by CRC and did not receive any new
trade secrets or confidential information upon returning to work with
CRC.50 2 Furthermore, with regard to the trade secrets that Defendants
learned during their initial employments with CRC, the trial court could
reasonably have believed that CRC abandoned the essential elements of
495. Id. at 765.
496. 923 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
497. Id. at 85.
498. Id.
499. Id.; see supra notes 459-65 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding claims
for breach of covenant not to compete.
500. Id.
501. 927 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, n.w.h.); see supra notes 467-
75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts.
502. Id. at 265.
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secrecy as to that information.50 3 CRC knew that Defendants accepted
other employment, after first working at CRC, where they utilized their
training and knowledge obtained at CRC.504 Thus, because an agreement
not to disclose what was once trade secret information, which lost its
trade secret status with the consent of the employer, is not enforceable,
and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying CRC's request
for a temporary injunction.505
In Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,506 the Texas
Supreme Court placed the burden to ensure confidentiality on the em-
ployer seeking to protect trade secrets.507 Upon certified questions the
court was asked to decide whether the discovery rule applies to the stat-
ute of limitations for misappropriation of trade secrets and whether this
two year statute of limitations violated the open courts provision of the
Texas Constitution. Claude Arney left a job with Computer Associates
International (Computer Associates) to work for Altai. Arney had
signed an agreement with Computer Associates agreeing not to divulge
or retain any trade secrets. However, when he left for Altai, he took with
him the computer source code for an operating system compatibility com-
ponent. Arney copied approximately thirty percent of this code in writ-
ing a similar program for Altai, although no one at Altai knew Arney
possessed or used trade secrets.
Normally, a cause of action would accrue when the trade secret was
used. However, since that would bar the Computer Associates claim,
Computer Associates argued that the discovery rule should apply to the
two year statute of limitations for misappropriation of trade secret claims
under section 16.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.508
Altai did not dispute that Computer Associates first learned of the misap-
propriation about a year after the limitations had run.509 In deciding
whether to apply the discovery rule, the court was guided by two princi-
ples, "(1) whether the injury was inherently undiscoverable; and (2)
whether evidence of the injury is objectively verifiable.15 1 0 The "inher-
ently undiscoverable" factor meant that the existence of the injury was
not ordinarily discoverable, even though due diligence was used.51' The
court stated that extensive precautions are taken to guard trade secrets
and noted that, generally, trade secret misappropriation generally was ca-
pable of detection within the statute of limitations.5 12 Also, the court
suggested precautions Computer Associates should have taken and
hinted that their suspicions should have been raised when a competitor
503. Id. at 266.
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. 918 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. 1996) (Owen, J., concurring opinion).
507. Id. at 458.
508. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon 1986).
509. Altai, 918 S.W.2d at 455.
510. Id. at 456.
511. Id.
512. Id. at 457.
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brought out a similar product previously developed by a former em-
ployee who now worked for that same competitor. 513 While recognizing
that thirty-nine states had adopted the discovery rule in this area,514 the
court stated that the discovery rule was a limited exception and held that
because "misappropriation of trade secrets is not a cause of action that is
inherently undiscoverable, permitting application of the discovery rule
exception in these cases would do no more than permit the litigation of
stale claims. '515 Finally, the court held that the two year statute of limi-
tations for these claims did not violate the open courts provision of Arti-
cle I, section 13 of the Texas Constitution.516
Employers suing to enforce covenants not to compete or enjoin misap-
propriation of trade secrets may find themselves subject of counterclaims
for malicious prosecution and related claims.517 In American Derringer
Corp. v. Bond,518 American Derringer Corporation (ADC) hired Greg
Bond as an engineer. Bond worked for almost a year before being fired.
ADC manufactured derringer-type handguns, and shortly after Bond's
firing, ADC learned that Bond intended to market a gun similar to one of
ADC's. ADC sued for misappropriation of trade secrets and the trial
court issued a restraining order prohibiting Bond from "manufacturing,
marketing, soliciting or offering for sale, advertising, promoting, or other-
wise displaying a Derringer styled pistol" with certain features. 519 The
court soon after dissolved the restraining order and Bond counterclaimed
for malicious prosecution. A jury found that Bond had not misappropri-
ated any trade secrets and that ADC lacked probable cause to sue Bond.
In discussing the malicious prosecution claim, the court noted that
ADC was aided by a presumption that it acted reasonably and in good
faith and therefore had probable cause.520 Going further, the court said
that it would focus on the reasonableness of ADC's conduct in instituting
suit, not on whether ADC's claim was valid.5 21 The evidence to be con-
sidered would be that which relates to the issue of probable cause, not
just to the issue of whether Bond misappropriated trade secrets. 52 2
Therefore, the court would consider only evidence occurring before ADC
sought injunctive relief and only evidence of ADC's beliefs, motives, and
good faith.52 3
The court pointed out that some of the details of the design and manu-
facture of ADC's derringer were subject to trade secret protection.
513. Id.
514. Id. at 458.
515. Id. at 457.
516. Id. at 459.
517. See DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 685.
518. 924 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. App.-Waco 1996, no writ).
519. Id. at 776.
520. Id. at 778 (citing Ellis County State Bank v. Keever, 888 S.W.2d 790, 794 (Tex.
1994)).
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Moreover, that Bond might have learned about derringers through other
means such as books did not mean that the company knew he had done
So.5 2 4 Bond also admitted that he gained full knowledge of the design
and manufacturing processes and customer comments and complaints,
the latter two being considered confidential by ADC, through his em-
ployment with ADC. Within a short period of time after Bond's termina-
tion, ADC learned that Bond was offering a similar gun for sale. Viewing
the pertinent evidence "from the standpoint of a reasonable, prudent per-
son under the circumstances with which ADC was faced, we find no evi-
dence that the motives, grounds, beliefs, and other evidence upon which
ADC acted were not probable cause to institute the proceeding that re-
sulted in the injunction being issued." 525 Since the evidence did not per-
mit the inference that ADC had no probable cause, Bond did not prove
one of the elements of his claim for malicious prosecution. The court
reversed the judgment of the trial court and rendered judgment that
Bond take nothing by his counterclaim. 526
IV. CONCLUSION
The cases reviewed dictate the importance of solid personnel practices,
reasoned management decisions, and consistent application of company
policies. As the frequency of litigating employment disputes increases,
employers should take the opportunity to examine their future actions
against the backdrop of existing case law. In many ways this Article but
scrapes the surface of the evolving and expanding area of employment
law litigation. While state courts will continue to preside over the wrong-
ful discharge and related statutory and common law claims associated
with employer and employee disputes, federal courts will be equally ac-
tive in application and interpretation of yet more federal statutory causes
of action arising out of the employment relationship.
524. Id.
525. Id. at 788.
526. Id.
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